Four essays in economics by Schneider, Yves
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2005
Four essays in economics
Schneider, Y
Schneider, Y. Four essays in economics. 2005, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, 2005.
Schneider, Y. Four essays in economics. 2005, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, 2005.
Four Essays in Economics
Dissertation
der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät
der Universität Zürich
zur Erlangung der Würde
eines Doktors der Ökonomie
vorgelegt von
Yves Schneider Bonassi
von Seftigen BE
genehmigt auf Antrag von
Prof Dr. P. Zweifel
Prof Dr. A. Schmutzler
Die Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Zürich gestattet hier-
durch die Drucklegung der vorliegenden Dissertation, ohne damit zu den darin
ausgesprochenen Anschauungen Stellung zu nehmen.
Zürich, den 9. November 2005
Der Dekan: Prof. Dr. H. P. Wehrli
ii
Vorwort
Meine Zeit am Sozialökonomischen Institut (SOI) der Universität Zürich begann
mit der Betreuung eines Projektes im Auftrag des Bundesamtes für Energie. Prof.
Dr. Peter Zweifel ermöglichte es mir, direkt nach Abschluss der Lizenziatsarbeit
ein interessantes, empirisches Projekt zu betreuen. Ich danke ihm herzlichst für
das mir entgegengebrachte Vertrauen und die lehrreiche gemeinsame Arbeit an
diesem Projekt. Die ersten beiden Aufsätze dieser Dissertation sind das Resultat
dieser Arbeit. Natürlich durfte ich mich auch nach Abschluss dieses Projektes
jederzeit über die Unterstützung durch Prof. Dr. Peter Zweifel erfreuen. Ich danke
auch Prof. Dr. Armin Schmutzler für seine Gesprächsbereitschaft und hilfreichen
Anregungen zu meiner Arbeit. Nicht weniger hilfreich waren die Denkanstösse
und Kommentare von Dr. Michael Breuer zu diversen Arbeiten von mir.
Die Idee zum dritten Papier entstand während einem Besuch in New York.
Gemeinsam mit Dr. Simon Lörtscher dachte ich über die Rolle von Supermärkten
nach: Wie viel komplizierter ist es doch, seinen geliebten Coop-Warenkorb im
Whole Foods Supermarkt zusammenzustellen. Es wäre doch viel praktischer, wenn
gleich um die Ecke 24th Street / 7th Avenue eine Coop-Filiale stünde. Das Resultat
dieser Überlegungen ist Aufsatz Nummer drei dieser Dissertation. Die Arbeit mit
Simon an diesem Aufsatz sowie die Diskussionen über andere Forschungsprojekte
und Ideen waren immer sehr bereichernd. Ich freue mich, noch lange gemeinsam
mit Simon Ökonomie zu betreiben. Hoffentlich war es nicht das letzte gemeinsame
Papier.
Während den ersten Jahren am SOI profitierte ich viel von den z.T. ausgedehn-
ten (Streit)gesprächen mit “der alten Garde” Dr. Hansjörg Lehmann, Dr. Markus
König, Dr. Lukas Steinmann und Dr. Harry Telser. Es freut mich sehr, dass der
Kontakt zu Ihnen bis heute anhält. Dass auch meine zweite Halbzeit am SOI
nicht allzu trostlos verlief, verdanke ich zu einem grossen Teil Karolin Becker
und Patrick Eugster. Die spannenden Diskussionen über Ökonomie und vieles
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andere bleiben mir in bester Erinnerung. Respekt gebührt auch meinen Bürokolle-
gen Chantal Grandchamp, Boris Krey und Christian Wyss, die meine Anwesenheit
meist ohne Klage ertragen haben.
Eine wesentliche Erleichterung für meine Recherchen war die Hilfsbereitschaft
der SOI-Bibliothek. Die Mitarbeiterinnen der SOI-Bibliothek haben mich jederzeit
unbürokratisch und effizient unterstützt. Zeitschriftenartikel suchen und Bücher
ausleihen war nie einfacher!
Natürlich sass ich in den letzten Jahren nicht nur im Institut am Schreibtisch.
Dank gebührt deshalb auch der Andorra Bar in Zürich für die fortwährend her-
ausragende Gastfreundschaft und die vielen gratis Pistazien. Spezieller Dank geht
auch an Daniel Gasser, Stephan Illi und Christoph Wälti. Die drei haben immer
wieder Zeit gefunden, mit mir das schöne Leben zu feiern. Besonders erholsam
waren und sind die gemeinsamen Go-Abende mit Stephan.
Da man sich den grössten Dank für den Schluss des Vorworts vorbehält, verbleibt
es mir meiner engsten Familie zu danken. Während der gesamten Zeit konnte ich
auf die Unterstützung durch meine Frau Tamara Bonassi zählen. Sie hat mich
oft ermuntert weiterzumachen. Schliesslich Danke ich meinen Eltern Fritz und
Kathrin Schneider dafür, dass sie mir diese Ausbildung ermöglicht haben und jed-
erzeit für mich da waren.
Zürich, im November 2005
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The four essays offered in this book all cover different topics in economics. The
first two essay are empirical investigations on consumers’ willingness-to-pay for
increased financial security with regard to nuclear power plant accidents. The third
essay addresses an industrial organization topic. It presents a model explaining the
advantage of chain stores compared to single outlet stores when consumers face
costs of switching their suppliers. The forth essay, finally, belongs to the realm of
finance. It develops a theoretical model explaining the circumstances that mitigate
credit constraints if projects are financed as divisions of a conglomerate rather than
as independent firms.
The first essay is the result of a study financed by the Swiss Federal Energy
Agency. The agency was interested in the optimal level of internalization of ex-
ternal costs caused by nuclear accidents. Certainly, a major nuclear accident will
have financial consequences which are not covered by nuclear energy suppliers
and thus will have to be borne by the public. Since the Swiss government already
mandates operators of nuclear power plants to purchase a liability insurance cov-
ering roughly 1 bn. CHF, it seemed obvious to ask how much more coverage by
liability insurance should be mandated in order to optimally internalize these costs.
This requires estimation of marginal costs and marginal benefits of an increase in
mandatory liability insurance. The essay presented investigates the benefit side
of this question and aims at estimating consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for
additional mandatory insurance coverage.
Estimated WTP for increased financial security concerning nuclear accidents
can be complemented with a spatial dimension. How does marginal willingness-
to-pay change with respect to distance of domiciles from the power plants? This
1
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aspect is addressed in chapter 3. Arguably, there are two effects working in oppo-
site directions; viz. a risk effect and a selection effect. According to the risk effect,
people located near a nuclear power plant are expected to show higher WTP values
than people located farther away. According to the selection effect, people living
closer to nuclear power plants are expected to be more favorable to nuclear energy
in general and less averse to their risk in particular. Therefore, their WTP should
be smaller than that of people located at greater distance. Indeed, the empirical
evidence is inconclusive with regard to the overall relationship between WTP and
distance from the nearest nuclear power plant. However, when the selection effect
is statistically controlled for, WTP values significantly decrease with distance.
Although these two essays seem almost unrelated to the latter two essays, there
is nonetheless a connection. In order to analyze optimal internalization of external
costs by governments, one must – in principle – explain why individuals and firms
cannot contract with each other and deal with the externality themselves. What
superior ability should a government have in solving the problem of externalities?
This is a controversial and long-standing question in economics and ultimately re-
lates to differences in transaction costs resulting from different governance regimes.
As firms might improve upon arm’s-length markets, governments might improve
upon firms. It is not the aim of this short introduction to elaborate on such an ex-
tensive topic, but rather to point out that the question of optimal internalization of
externalities also relates to the question of optimal governance structures. One rea-
son for the existence of firms lies in the fact that they are a means for internalizing
externalities in arm’s-length markets (see for instance Holmstrom, 1999). A gov-
ernment which is able to force its citizens to obey its laws must have some superior
ability to internalize certain externalities compared to firms, which do not have this
authority.
The first two essays do not address these theoretical questions of optimal gov-
ernance but deal with a specific instrument for internalizing a particular externality,
viz. the risk of nuclear power plant accidents. The latter two essays neither address
optimal governance in such a general sense, but are both concerned with rather
specific questions relating to the boundaries of firms.
The third essay, entitled “Switching Costs, Firm Size, and Market Structure”,
takes a technological perspective in discussing the advantage of “large” over “small”
firms. Whenever consumers shop at a new supplier for the first time, they in-
cur some fixed costs for getting acquainted with the particular characteristics and
2
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products of this supplier. This non-convex consumption technology generates an
advantage for multi-outlet (chain) stores. If consumers are mobile and therefore
change locations, a chain store in fact insures them against the risk of incurring
these fixed costs again at the new location. If instead they patronize local stores,
they again must incur fixed costs of getting accustomed to the local store at the new
location. It is shown that if consumers are heterogenous with respect to these fixed
costs of consumption, chain stores and local stores coexist in equilibrium and that
local stores charge lower prices than chain stores.
The forth essay addresses the question of optimal firm size in a contract the-
oretical framework. Firms are modeled as being credit constrained, i.e. not all
profitable ventures can attract the outside investments necessary to undertake them.
The essay seeks to answer the question whether these credit constraints are miti-
gated if two firms finance their projects jointly. The model presented motivates
credit constraints by contractual incompleteness and moral hazard. The quality of
a firm or project is assumed to be non-verifiable and thus not contractible. In addi-
tion, asymmetric information between investors and entrepreneurs is assumed. As
pointed out in the literature (see, e.g., Shin and Stulz, 1998), asymmetric informa-
tion is a key ingredient in explaining the tripartite structure of financing envisaged
in this model, viz. outside investor contracting with headquarters and headquar-
ters contracting with project managers. Otherwise it is difficult to imagine why
actors in external capital markets (investors and headquarters) are not capable of
using the same contracts as actors in internal capital markets (headquarters and
project managers). However, actors in internal capital markets enjoy an informa-
tional advantage because they are bound by an informal employment contract that
serves to limit moral hazard. Therefore, they can simultaneously use this informal
employment contract and a formal financial contract with the investor to finance
their investments jointly. It is shown that investors prefer to finance some types of
projects as conglomerate in order to take advantage the superior information. On
the other hand, they prefer to finance other types of projects as independent firms.
Note that Peter Zweifel co-authored chapter 2 and 3, Christian Wyss co-authored
chapter 3 and Simon Lörtscher co-authored chapter 4. While the undersigned au-
thor was at least equally responsible for the intellectual input to chapters 2 and 4
as his co-authors, the main contribution to chapter 3 is by Peter Zweifel. Chapter 2
appeared in the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, chapter 3 is under review with the
American Economic Review and the chapter 4 will be submitted to an industrial
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economics journal soon. The last chapter has working paper status and requires
additional effort to make it suitable for submission.
Yves Schneider
Zürich, September 2005
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Chapter 2
How Much Internalization of
Nuclear Risk Through Liability
Insurance?
2.1 Introduction
Nuclear power plants provoke conflicts in many countries. While many voters
and politicians are committed on this issue, others will gauge the advantages and
disadvantages of the nuclear option. On the downside, an important consideration
is that with a very small probability, an accident causing billions of Dollars of
damage may occur.
This paper seeks to estimate the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of Swiss citizens
for relief from the financial consequences of a severe nuclear accident, to be pro-
vided by an extension of liability insurance coverage mandated to nuclear power
operators. This statement of objective calls for two clarifications. First, the risk
to be considered needs to be defined. In the production process of nuclear energy,
at least ten stages can be identified, each with its proper risks (Hirschberg et al.,
1998). This paper deals exclusively with the risks of nuclear energy produced in
Switzerland. Second, it focuses on mandatory liability insurance as an instrument
for risk internalization. The many norms that govern the production of nuclear
power, monitored by the Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK), are simply
taken as given.
This regulation in combination with the legal norm of liability still leaves room
for what Shavell (1986) calls the judgement proof problem. The judgement proof
problem consists of the possibility that nuclear power plant operators may fail to
7
How Much Internalization of Nuclear Risk Through Liability Insurance?
pay compensation for the damage caused, due to lack of assets. As shown by
Shavell, mandatory liability insurance serves to avoid this shortcoming. This find-
ing justifies considering mandatory liability insurance as an instrument of nuclear
risk internalization.
In Switzerland, the current coverage of CHF 0.7 billion (bn.) (approx. US$
0.47 bn. at 2002 exchange rates) written by private insurers will hardly be sufficient
to compensate the victims of an accident. However, an extension of coverage will
result in a higher outlay for nuclear power. No market for individually contracted
supplementary coverage has developed, quite likely because there are no contrac-
tual relationships between nuclear insurers and consumers to build upon. There-
fore, determining the importance accorded to more comprehensive relief from the
financial consequences of a severe nuclear accident amounts to estimating the in-
crease in the price of electricity that would be accepted by consumers in return for
extended liability coverage to be bought by plant operators.
‘Stated choice’ rather than conventional ‘contingent valuation’ experiments
were conducted to measure WTP. In ‘stated choice’, different attributes of elec-
tric power are distinguished and varied from one scenario to the next. This should
avoid fixation on the price attribute which in ‘contingent valuation’ may cause re-
spondents to forget about alternate uses of their income, thus resulting in excessive
estimates of WTP. Moreover, respondents are not asked to provide rankings but
only to choose between the status quo and one alternative at a time, which serves
to bring the experimental situation close to everyday decision making.
The basic hypothesis is that opting for the alternative must entail a utility gain
that can be related to the levels of the attributes pertaining to the scenario. There-
fore, the utility associated with an attribute can be inferred from the observed
choice sequences using a Probit model. Since the surcharge per kwh is one of
the attributes, it is possible to calculate WTP values for the other attributes (in
particular, extension of insurance coverage).
Indeed, respondents valued five attributes of power in a way that is consistent
with economic theory, and median estimated WTP amounts to a realistic 0.14 US
cents per kwh. Since quite probably the extra cost of a fivefold extension of present
liability coverage is below this figure, the benefits of such an extension exceed its
cost, suggesting an improvement of efficiency.
8
How Much Internalization of Nuclear Risk Through Liability Insurance?
A
B
D
C
1%2% 20%
1
2
3
preference gradient
Insurance coverage
blackouts / year
Figure 2.1: Trading off different product attributes.
2.2 Determining Willingness to Pay Through ‘Stated Choice’
For goods and services traded on markets, there is no need to measure willingness
to pay (WTP). By accepting a price the customer reveals that his WTP is at least as
high as the price. The safety of nuclear power plants is not yet traded on markets
(though it is possible to think of nuke-bonds which mature in case of a prespeci-
fied accident). Neither does individually contracted insurance against nuclear risks
exist which would reveal potential victims’ willingness to pay for nuclear safety.
2.2.1 ‘Stated Choice’ Methodology
In the absence of opportunities to observe revealed preferences, it is necessary to
measure stated preferences through experiments. Earlier attempts to measure WTP
for nonmarket goods used the contingent valuation variant of stated preference (see
e.g. Mitchell (1989) and Hausman (1993)). This methodology can also be applied
to risk reduction, see e.g. Krupnick et al. (2002).
In the present context, respondents would have to state the maximum amount
per kwh they would be prepared to pay for the increased financial security achieved
by an extension of mandatory liability insurance. The difficulty with this direct ap-
proach is that in real life people hardly ever ask themselves such questions. Rather,
they compare the attributes of a good and its price and then decide to buy it or not.
The ‘stated choice’ approach, developed by Louviere and Hensher (1982), seeks
9
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to simulate this everyday decision making. Rather than directly asking for willing-
ness to pay, it seeks to elicit it indirectly through ’accept’/’reject’ choices. Its basic
assumption is that individuals derive utility from the attributes of products and are
willing to trade them off against each other (Lancaster, 1966). The first application
of stated choice to risk reduction seems to be Telser and Zweifel (2002), which ex-
tends the paired comparison approach used in Magat et al. (1988) to a framework
of multiple product attributes and ordinal utility.
In the present context, the ‘stated choice’ method allows individuals to choose
among different types of electricity. During the decision process, the attributes
(among them price) of electricity are traded off against each other. By observ-
ing several similar decisions it is possible to estimate how much income (through
higher electricity prices) respondents are ready to give up in return for an increased
amount of some other desired attribute.
One particular tradeoff is illustrated in figure 2.1. Utility increases with insur-
ance coverage in the event of an accident (as a percentage of maximum possible
loss) and decreases with the average number of power blackouts; both attributes
were found to be relevant to the persons interviewed (see section 2.3). Assume
that the status quo is given by combination A (1% insurance coverage, 2 black-
outs/year). Point B indicates that the individual is willing to accept a slightly higher
number of blackouts if insurance coverage is raised to 2%. The corresponding sac-
rifice in terms of security of supply is the marginal WTP for an increased insurance
coverage.
Now participants in the experiment are asked to evaluate additional combina-
tions, for example point C. If C is accepted, then the individual’s indifference curve
must lie above C. Next, it must lie below point D if D is rejected. Proceeding in this
manner, it is possible to approximate the indifference curve. Finally, the marginal
willingness to pay measured in money terms (MWP) can be estimated in the same
way, by introducing the increase in the price of electricity as an additional product
attribute. The corresponding increase in the outlay on electricity is a sacrifice of
income which would otherwise be available for spending on other goods.
Summing up, using ‘stated choice’ the experimenter is not limited to varying
only price and insurance coverage but can introduce other attributes that influence
real life decisions concerning electricity. Failing this, he runs the risk of causing
respondents to associate with variations in price or insurance coverage attributes
not explicitly included in the experiment (and therefore assumed as fixed).
10
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2.2.2 Problems With Risk Assessment
The ultimate objective of this work is to provide guidance to public regulation. For
this purpose it would be preferable to have experiments based on objective prob-
abilities. However, in the present context objective probabilities are not available
since experts differ in their estimates of the probability of a catastrophic nuclear
accident (Zweifel and Umbricht, 2002). In this situation, respondents’ own sub-
jective estimates become crucially important. Specifically the additional ambiguity
caused may affect respondents’ level of expected utility as well as their tradeoffs
between attributes such as the one shown in figure 2.1 (Viscusi, 1998, ch. 2).
Ganderton et al. (2000) provide a possible solution to the problem of ambi-
guity. They conduct laboratory experiments where subjects had to decide about
insurance against a low probability - high consequence event. Several draws from
a loss function known to participants were revealed to subjects, who made choices
largely consistent with predictions of the expected utility theory. However, the loss
function cannot be claimed to be known in the present context.
Another problem is low probabilities. Here, Kunreuther et al. (2001) found
that supplying a reference point in terms of a more probable and familiar risk and
providing a good deal of contextual information helped respondents in dealing with
low probabilities. In the present study, experts’ average estimated probability of the
highest possible loss served as the reference point. However, respondents were not
asked to adopt this value, but to indicate their own probability estimate relative to
that of the experts. The required contextual information comes from two sources,
viz. the introduction to the experiment (see appendix 2.6.1) and the remaining
attributes characterizing types of power, which moreover are allowed to vary during
the ‘stated choice’ experiment. In sum, this setup serves to reduce the complexity
of the choice situations by only incorporating the loss dimension of risk, while still
allowing the effect of different beliefs about the loss probabilities to be estimated.
Figure 2.2 shows the frequencies of deviations from the reference point (the
scale used to elicit this information can be found in appendix 2.6.2). More pes-
simistic beliefs clearly outweigh optimistic deviations, in keeping with findings
reported by Camerer and Kunreuther (1989).
11
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Figure 2.2: Beliefs about loss probabilities relative to experts’ estimates. X-axis
shows probability deviations in powers of 10 (see appendix 2.6.2).
2.3 Experimental Design
In the context of a ‘stated choice’ experiment several issues must be addressed.
What product attributes are to be included? How many levels should be distin-
guished in an attribute? How should the level of attributes vary between choice
scenarios? How many choice scenarios should be presented to each respondent?
An extensive literature is devoted to these and other issues (see e.g. Louviere et al.
(2000) and Hedayat et al. (1999)).
2.3.1 Determination of Attributes and Their Levels
First of all, the relevant attributes of electric power need to be identified. Their
number must be kept low for the decision problem to remain manageable. In a
separate survey, approximately 500 persons were asked in spring 2001 to rate 15
different attributes, assigning them ranks between 1 (not important) and 10 (very
important). Among the most important were: secure and sustainable waste disposal
(9.26), size of area exposed to hazard (8.91), reliability (low frequency of black-
outs) (8.68), financial compensation of the victims in case of an accident (8.78),
and average price per kwh (7.69).
Next, levels have to be assigned to attributes. Again they must be few in num-
ber in order to avoid long interviews. But then, the levels must reach sufficiently
extreme values to cause respondents to switch from “accept” to “reject” and vice
12
How Much Internalization of Nuclear Risk Through Liability Insurance?
Table 2.1: Levels of attributes.
Attribute Levels (Codingc) Unit Status quo
Price 0; 10; 30; 60 (0;...;60) percent 0
Blackouts 2; 14 (0;1) numb./year 2
Waste unresolved problems (1); unresolved
no unresolved problems (0) problems
Damagea 0.1; 10; 100; 200 (0.1;...;200) CHF bn. 200
Coverageb 1; 20; 50; 100 (1;...;100) percent 1
a Values in US$ bn: 0.065; 6.5; 65; 130 (at 2002 exchange rates)
b Coverage in percent of loss
c Bold for status quo
versa.
To test the questionnaire, six persons were interviewed in a first pretest. With-
out exception they understood the questions and were able to process the choice
scenarios without problems. However, the attribute ‘insurance coverage’ was re-
garded as relatively unimportant.
A second pretest comprising 20 persons was conducted, with the maximum
price hike boosted to 60 percent in order to induce a sufficient frequency of rejected
scenarios (compared to the status quo). The most important attribute was again safe
waste disposal, this time followed by insurance coverage and price.
For the final survey the five product attributes ‘price’, ‘blackout’, ‘waste dis-
posal’, ‘damage’ and ‘insurance coverage’ were used. Table 2.1 gives an overview
and the next section describes the attributes in detail.
2.3.2 Description of Attributes
Price. The attribute ‘Price’ is the percentage increase caused by the extension of
liability insurance coverage over the status quo. It read, e.g., “30 percent more ex-
pensive than at present (this is equivalent to a surcharge of CHF 285 on an annual
electricity bill of CHF 950)”. To obtain an absolute value for willingness to pay
(WTP), this value was later multiplied by the actual annual electricity bill as indi-
cated by respondents. Throughout the analysis it was assumed that respondents do
not change the quantity of energy consumed. With this assumption, the higher price
can be translated into a higher total outlay for electricity, and hence a lower dispos-
able income which thus becomes a product attribute in the econometric analysis
(see section 2.4.2).
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Blackout. The attribute ‘Blackout’ indicates if the scenario considered has
a high incidence of blackouts (14 per year, coded 1) or a low incidence (2 per
year, coded 0). It is a proxy of service reliability. The scenario description read,
“... In Switzerland, blackouts are rare and mainly caused by environmental effects
(storms) or maintenance work...”
Waste. Since ‘Waste’ was an important attribute in both pretests, it had to be
included in the final experiment. This variable takes on two values: Either there are
unresolved problems with waste disposal (=1), or there are no unresolved problems
with waste disposal (=0). ‘Waste’ was described as follows, “... Disposal of waste
occasions problems and risks of variable magnitude. This holds in particular for
nuclear waste, where these problems are not resolved yet.”
Damage. This indicates that electricity generation may cause a (hypothetical)
maximum loss amounting to e.g. CHF 100 bn. (appr. US$ 65 bn.) in the event
of an accident. In order to make this amount more comprehensible, it was also
expressed as an average damage per household. The attribute description said,
“... All types of generating facility can cause accidents. Large scale accidents are
rare. The magnitude of an accident cannot be calculated with precision but strongly
depends on the type of facility. ”
Coverage. This indicates the part of maximum loss which would be covered
by liability insurance. The text said, e.g., “one percent of the financial damage is
insured”. See figure 2.3 for an example.
Note that the probability of an accident is not among the product attributes, as
explained in section 2.2.2.
Figure 2.3 shows one of the choice scenarios. Type A power is always asso-
ciated with the status quo scenario to simplify decision making. Type B power
has the same five attributes as type A, but with levels changed with regard to four
of them. Thus, by simply deciding between types A and B, respondents implic-
itly trade off attributes. Since this choice is repeated several times with varying
attribute levels for type B, these tradeoffs become estimable.
2.3.3 Scenario Selection
The design summarized in table 2.1 gives rise to 256 possible scenarios.1 Ob-
viously this is an excessive number for the questionnaire, calling for a reduced
14 · 2 · 2 · 4 · 4 = 256.
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 Decision No. 4209 
  
Type A power 
 
Type B power 
      
Price A kilowatt hour costs the same 
as today 
 
A kilowatt hour is 60 percent 
more expensive than today 
  
   
Blackouts 2 blackouts per 
year on average 
  
2 blackouts per 
year on average 
 
  
   
Waste There are unresolved problems 
with waste disposal 
 
 
There are no unresolved 
problems with waste disposal 
  
   
Damage A large scale accident can 
cause losses up to a maximum 
of Swiss francs 200 bn. (This 
amounts to Swiss francs 70,000 
per household on average) 
 
 
A large scale accident can 
cause losses up to a maximum 
of Swiss francs 100 mn. (This 
amounts to Swiss francs 35 per 
household on average) 
 
  
   
Insurance 
Coverage 
1 percent of this maximum 
damage is covered 
 
100 percent of this maximum 
damage is covered 
 Type A   Type B 
Your Choice 
cannot decide 
 
Figure 2.3: Example of a choice scenario.
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design. This was constructed using ‘Gosset’, a general purpose program for de-
signing experiments (Hardin and Sloane, 1993) (see appendix 2.6.3 for the pro-
gram code). ‘Gosset’ selects the vectors of a regressor matrix X in a way as to
minimize or maximize a function of the covariance matrix of the parameters to be
estimated, viz. (X′X)−1 in the case of OLS. The D-optimality criterion which was
used in the present experiment, maximizes the determinant of the Fisher informa-
tion matrix. While ‘Gosset’ solves this maximization problem for linear models
(such as OLS) only, it is a reasonable approximation for nonlinear models such as
probit (Kanninen, 2002). The reduced design was chosen to enable estimation of
all quadratic as well as all interaction terms between product attributes. In this way,
the number of scenarios to be included in the survey was reduced to 42.
Since it is not possible for a respondent to evaluate all 42 scenarios, 14 scenar-
ios were chosen at random. This resulted in a unique ‘stated choice’ questionnaire
for each person interviewed.
2.3.4 Design of the Questionnaire
The questionnaire was divided into four parts. The first part consisted of some gen-
eral warm-up questions concerning energy use. In addition the yearly electricity
outlay of the respondent was asked for.
The second part contained information about the consequences of severe acci-
dents in power production, focusing on nuclear and hydro (see appendix 2.6.1 for
details). In Switzerland fossil fuels are negligible in electricity generation. In ad-
dition, the limited coverage of current nuclear liability insurance was evoked. Two
solutions to this problem were sketched. First, the government could raise tax to
compensate victims in the event of an accident. Second, mandated insurance cov-
erage could be extended, which however would result in higher electricity prices.
Respondents were asked to state their subjective probability of a severe accident
relative to that of experts (see appendix 2.6.2). Finally the attributes used in the
stated choice part of the questionnaire were explained (see section 2.3.2 above).
The third part contained the scenarios for the ‘stated choice’ experiment.
In the fourth part, socioeconomic data and information concerning the under-
standing of the ‘stated choice’ experiment were collected. Some 20 percent of
respondents reported difficulties with the questionnaire. Roughly 73 percent stated
they considered one of the attributes to be of overriding importance, which could
be interpreted as an indication of lexicographic preferences. However, the econo-
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metric analysis failed to produce evidence suggesting that these individuals traded
off attributes less frequently or less consistently.
2.4 Econometric Analysis
2.4.1 Data
Face to face interviews were performed in the German speaking part of Switzerland
during September and October 2001. In total, 391 persons were interviewed. Av-
erage income of respondents is CHF 42, 000 (US$ 28, 000) having a yearly outlay
on electricity of CHF 940 (US$ 630). 80 percent had a medium level of education
(either vocational school, community college, technical college or equivalent edu-
cation) and the average age was 42. Moreover, the sample was designed to have an
equal proportion of men and women.
With 391 persons each evaluating 14 (out of a total of 42) choice scenarios,
a total of 5, 474 decisions were recorded. Respondents who felt unable to decide
could always choose the option “not able to decide”. This served to prevent choices
made at random by individuals who in fact were indifferent or unable to decide.
In 819 cases (15 percent), no choice was stated, resulting in 4, 655 usable ob-
servations. Only 90 percent of these (4, 154) were used for estimation, while 10
percent were put aside for an out-of-sample test (section 2.4.5). In 27 percent of
choices, the status quo was preferred. Missing values for socioeconomic informa-
tion resulted in a final reduction to 4, 119 observations.
2.4.2 Theoretical Background and Specification
No attempt was made to anchor specification in expected utility theory. Instead a
general utility function in the retained attributes with linear, quadratic and mixed
terms is used. To allow for heterogeneous preferences, socioeconomic characteris-
tics of the respondents are interacted with income net of electricity outlay (i.e. dis-
posable income), in accordance with Johnson and Desvousges (1997). This leads
to the following utility function for individual i and power type j :
Ui j = αX j + β1wi j + β2w2i j + γ1ziwi j + γ2ziw
2
i j , (2.1)
where X j includes all linear, quadratic and mixed terms of electricity attributes,
except disposable income wi j. Disposable income is given by wi j :=
(
mi − outlayi j
)
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with mi for income and outlayi j for total outlay on electricity, zi denotes the vector
of socioeconomic variables, and α, β1, β2, γ1, γ2 are to be estimated.
According to the random utility model (McFadden, 2001), the respondent eval-
uates the utility of the two scenarios and chooses the one with the higher utility. If
‘A’ denotes the attribute values of the status quo scenario, then individual i chooses
the alternative (B) of choice set j if UiB j > UiA j , i.e. if
α(XB j − XA j) + β1(1 − di)(wiB j − wiA j) + β2(1 − di)(w2iB j − w2iA j)
+γ1zi(1 − di)(wiB j − wiA j) + γ2(1 − di)zi(w2iB j − w2iA j)
+δ1di(wiB j − wiA j) + δ2zidi(wiB j − wiA j)
+δ3di(w2iB j − w2iA j) + δ4dizi(w2iB j − w2iA j) + ηi + ǫi j > 0 .
(2.2)
In addition to equation (2.1), equation (2.2) contains a dummy variable di to
reflect the fact that income is missing with 43 percent of all individuals. It takes
on the value of zero if income was revealed and one if missing, in which case the
difference in disposable income reduces to the (inverse) difference of electricity
outlay.
The error term appearing in this comparision has an individual-specific (ηi)
and a general component (ǫi j) that also varies with the choice set presented. The
two components are assumed to conform to the usual random effects specification
(Greene, 1997, ch. 14), with ρ = var(ηi)/var(ηi + ǫi j).
The dependent variable yi j (choice of power type B) is given by
yi j =
{
1 if inequality (2.2) holds
0 otherwise. (2.3)
From this expression it becomes clear that the variables used in estimation are the
differences between the attribute levels of scenario B and scenario A. For instance
damage is defined as the maximum level of loss in scenario B minus the maximum
level of loss in scenario A. For example, an individual opting for type B power in
decision no. 4209 of figure 2.3 and having revealed his or her income has the fol-
lowing observation vector, in keeping with table 2.1: (y; blackout; waste; damage;
coverage; . . .; blackout2; waste2; damage2; coverage2 ; . . .) = (1; 0 − 0; 0 − 1;
0.1 − 200; 100 − 1; . . .; 02 − 02; 02 − 12; 0.12 − 2002; 1002 − 12; . . .). Personal
characteristics, which do not change between scenarios, drop out of the regression
unless they interact with electricity attributes.
18
How Much Internalization of Nuclear Risk Through Liability Insurance?
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for variables used in estimation.
Mean Median Unit
blackoutsa) 0.48 0 dummy
wastea) -0.49 0 dummy
damagea) -128 -190 CHF bn.
coveragea) 43 49 percent
disposable incomea) -152 0 CHF
damage2 b) -28,175 -39,900 CHF bn.
coverage2 b) 3,360 2,500 percent
outlay on electricity 940 840 CHF
income (if revealed) 41,890 36,000 CHF / year
income not revealed 0.43 0 dummy
age 43 42 years
sex is female 0.51 1 dummy
pessimistic beliefs 0.72 1 dummy
medium level of educationc) 0.82 1 dummy
high level of education 0.08 0 dummy
a) Denotes difference between status quo (A) and alternatives (B j), see section 2.4.2
b) Difference of squared values, e.g. damage2 = damage2B − damage2A
c) Vocational school, community college, technical college
2.4.3 Explanatory variables
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics for some of the variables used. The product
attributes were already explained in section 2.3. Note that outlay on electricity
rather than price was used as an explanatory variable. In this way, an increase in
outlay (occasioned by a higher price) can be interpreted as a reduction of disposable
income. Of course, this holds only if outlay and price move in fixed proportions,
i.e. if the quantity of power consumed stays constant. Since price elasticities of
the household demand for electricity are low in Switzerland (Bonomo et al., 1998),
this assumption is justifiable.
Product attributes appear in linear, quadratic, and mixed form. The dummy
variables for blackout and waste cannot be squared because of multicollinearity. In
keeping with section 2.4.2, only the difference in the attributes between scenario B
(the alternative scenario) and scenario A (the status quo) are relevant for estimation.
Therefore all product attribute variables in table 2.2 are differences between A and
B, e.g. damage is defined as damageB − damageA and damage2 as damage2B −
damage2A (note that damage2 , (damageB − damageA)2).
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Table 2.3: Estimation of utility function.
Variables (selection) Coefficient S.E.
many blackouts (blackouts) -0.26656** 0.09293
unresolved waste disposal problems (waste) -0.67369** 0.09702
damage in 100 CHF bn. (damage) 0.06612 0.15924
insurance coverage in percent (coverage) 0.01416** 0.00329
disposable income in CHF 000s (income) 2.9755* 1.4302
income2 0.0228 0.0142
damage2 -0.2320** 0.0794
coverage2 -0.00009** 0.00003
damage*coverage 0.0342** 0.0106
coverage*blackouts -0.00363* 0.00164
(pessimistic beliefs) * income -1.0153 0.6523
(medium level education)* income2 -0.0239+ 0.0136
(high level education)*income -6.7719** 1.6609
age*income 0.0480* 0.0211
age*income2 -0.0002+ 0.0001
constant 0.22319+ 0.13173
For complete estimation results see appendix 2.6.4
Observations 4119
Number of individuals 375
Log likelihood -1959.67
Log likelihood constant only -2326.77
ρ 0.5425
ση 1.0890
+ significant at 10%,* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.
2.4.4 Estimation Results
General Findings
The model from equation (2.3) was estimated using a random-effects probit speci-
fication. Estimation result for the utility function are displayed in table 2.3 as well
as in appendix 2.6.4.
The linear forms of four out of five product attributes have the expected sign;
note that (disposable) income has become a function of outlay and thus constitutes
a product attribute. While damage has an unexpected (but insignificant) positive
coefficient, the negative sign of damage2 changes the overall impact from positive
to negative for a large subset of values of explanatory variables.
Most importantly, the coefficients for coverage and income have both a pos-
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Figure 2.4: Density of MWP in US cents/kwh. damage = 200 (US$ 130 bn.),
waste = 1, blackouts = 0 and coverage = 1. (Epanechnikov kernel with a band-
width of 0.66)
itive and significant effect on utility and hence choice probability. Finally, there
is some indication of respondents who hold a more pessimistic belief than experts
with regard to the probability of an accident having a lower marginal utility of
income over a large range of income (see the not quite significant coefficient of
pessimistic belie f s*income). In keeping with equation (2.4) below, this should
result in a higher marginal willingness to pay for additional coverage. The same
holds for individuals with a high education level, however, the negative basis effect
evidenced in table 2.3 is so strong that their WTP remains negative over the whole
range of coverage.
Finally, the goodness of fit, measured by a pseudo-R2 of 0.16, is satisfactory for
a random-effects specification. The significantly positive value of ρ = 0.54 shows
that 54 percent of the variance of the error term can be attributed to individual-
specific effects.
Calculation of MWP for Financial Security
The marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for additional coverage is given by
MWP = ∂
ˆU/∂coverage
∂ ˆU/∂income
, (2.4)
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Figure 2.5: MWP in US cents/kwh including 95 percent confidence intervals; 42
year old woman, medium level education, pessimistic beliefs, income US$ 24, 000,
damage = 200 (US$ 130 bn.), waste = 1, blackouts = 0, outlay = 840 (US$ 560).
with income defined as income net of outlay on electricity so that ∂ ˆU/∂income is
the estimated marginal utility of disposable income. The ratio between the mar-
ginal utility of coverage and the marginal utility of income defines the MWP for
additional financial security through increased insurance coverage. In order to ex-
press the MWP in terms of US cents per kwh, the quantity of power consumed must
be known. This was calculated as the annual outlay devided by the average price
of electricity at the household level during the year 1999 (16.2 Swiss cents/kwh,
i.e. US 11 cents/kwh), obtaining
MWP[US cents/kWh] := MWP[US$/year] · 100
Outlay in US$/0.11 (2.5)
In order to get an impression of the MWP across the entire sample, the MWP
for increased coverage was calculated for each person based on his or her spe-
cific socioeconomic characteristics and a power type which has few blackouts
(blackouts = 0), unresolved problems with waste disposal (waste = 1), a maxi-
mum possible loss of CHF 200 bn. (US$ 130 bn.) and initial coverage amounting
to a mere 1 percent (coverage = 1 percentage). The resulting density function is
shown in figure 2.4.
For the calculation of this density function, only the subsample of individuals
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who stated their income was used. Average MWP for this group amounts to 0.16
US cents/kwh, median MWP to 0.14 US cents/kwh. Compared to the average
price of 11 cents paid in 1999, this corresponds to 1.3 percent of the electricity
price. This does not seem excessive a priori, especially when taking the decline of
MWP with increasing coverage into account (see figure 2.5).
In order to check whether these MWP values are significantly different from
zero, standard errors were calculated, using the delta-method although it may result
in an underestimate (see e.g. Polsky et al. (1997) and Telser (2002, ch. 4)). The
alternatives would have been the Filler method, which only works for a simple ratio
of coefficients, and bootstrapping.
Figure 2.5 shows the MWP of a person with median characteristics (woman
aged 44 with medium level of education and pessimistic beliefs) along with its 95
percent confidence intervals. Estimated MWP declines, becoming indistinguish-
able from zero near an initial coverage rate of 95 percent. At a coverage level of
100 percent at the latest, MWP should theoretically be zero. However, this restric-
tion was in no way built into the experiment. Figure 2.5 thus may be considered as
providing preliminary evidence for the experiment’s validity.
Plausibility tests of estimated MWP
A first plausibility test derives from the influence of income on MWP. If financial
security is a normal economic good, MWP should be higher than average among
individuals with high income. This prediction is borne out in figure 2.6. However,
these differences lack statistical significance.
Second, due to the income effect, MWP should decline with increasing outlay
on electricity. This is indeed the case without exception in both tables 2.4 and
2.5. Moreover, MWP again decreases with initial coverage for a given value of
electricity outlay, confirming figures 2.5 and 2.6.
Comparison of tables 2.4 and 2.5 (with maximum loss doubled) shows that
MWP increases systematically with maximum possible loss. This too corresponds
with theoretical considerations if risk aversion is assumed (Chambers and Quiggin,
2000, ch. 3).
Finally, under very general conditions, the MWP of a risk averse individual is
predicted to increase with increasing probability of an accident. Evaluation of the
equation for MWP with regard to all relevant levels of the attributes shows that
the MWP of individuals with pessimistic beliefs (probability of accident is higher
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Figure 2.6: MWP in US cents/kwh of a 42 year old woman with medium level
education, pessimistic beliefs and outlay on electricity of CHF 840 (US$ 560) per
year. Maximum loss is CHF 200 bn. (US$ 130 bn.). Incomes at US$ 6,700;
24,000; 47,000; 93,000 respectively.
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Coverage Electricity outlay (US$ per year)
(percent) 400 530 670 800 930 1070 1200
0 0.1306 0.0979 0.0783 0.0652 0.0559 0.0489 0.0434
20 0.1063 0.0797 0.0637 0.0531 0.0455 0.0398 0.0353
40 0.0820 0.0615 0.0491 0.0409 0.0351 0.0307 0.0273
60 0.0576 0.0432 0.0346 0.0288 0.0247 0.0216 0.0192
80 0.0333 0.0250 0.0200 0.0166 0.0142 0.0125 0.0111
100 0.0090 0.0067 0.0054 0.0045 0.0038 0.0034 0.0030
Table 2.4: MWP in US cents/kwh of a 42 year old woman with medium level
education, pessimistic beliefs and an income of US$ 24, 000. Maximum loss is
CHF 100 bn. (US$ 65 bn.), waste = 1, blackouts = 0.
Coverage Electricity outlay (US$ per year)
(percent) 400 530 670 800 930 1070 1200
0 0.1545 0.1158 0.0926 0.0771 0.0661 0.0578 0.0514
20 0.1301 0.0976 0.0780 0.0650 0.0557 0.0487 0.0433
40 0.1058 0.0793 0.0634 0.0528 0.0453 0.0396 0.0352
60 0.0815 0.0611 0.0488 0.0407 0.0349 0.0305 0.0271
80 0.0571 0.0428 0.0343 0.0285 0.0244 0.0214 0.0190
100 0.0328 0.0246 0.0197 0.0164 0.0140 0.0123 0.0109
Table 2.5: MWP in US cents/kwh of a 42 year old woman with medium level of
education, pessimistic beliefs and an income of US$ 24, 000. Maximum loss is
CHF 200 bn. (US$ 130 bn.), waste = 1, blackouts = 0.
than experts’ estimate) is indeed greater than with beliefs congruent with experts’
estimate. This effect, however, is not significant.
2.4.5 Out-of-Sample Test
The two performance criteria of an empirical investigation are its reliability and
validity (Singleton and Straits, 1999). Reliability refers to the stability and consis-
tency of the operational definition (here: MWP); validity refers to the goodness of
fit between the operational definition and the concept that it is supposed to measure
(here: valuation of nuclear risks).
Since effective choices cannot be observed and compared with the stated choices
in the experiment, it is not possible to check validity directly, i.e. whether estimated
MWP for a reduction of financial risk is a good proxi for the valuation of financial
consequences of nuclear risks.
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However, there are studies suggesting that the ‘stated choice’ method leads to
results that are in line with corresponding hedonic price estimations (Gegax and Stanley
(1997), Louviere et al. (1999), and Haener et al. (2000)). This suggests validity.
As to reliability, an out-of-sample test can be performed on the 10 percent of
observations that were not used for estimation. The model predicts the probability
of choosing the alternate scenario. For a calculated probability of more than 50
percent, the individual is assumed to choose the alternate scenario. It turns out that
out of sample, roughly 70 percent of all decisions were predicted correctly. This
share has to be compared to the share of correct decisions which would result from
a random process. In the sample used for estimation, the alternate scenario was
chosen 63 percent of the time. Now, a random process that generates choice of the
alternate scenario in 63 percent of all cases and of the status quo scenario in 27
percent would predict correctly in 47 percent of cases. This value is the sum of the
probability that the random process predicted the alternative and that the alternative
was actually chosen (0.632) plus the probability that it predicted the status quo and
that the status quo was actually chosen (0.272).
The estimated utility model thus serves to increase the share of correct predic-
tions by 23 percentage points (= 70 − 47) over a random process. This points to a
measure of reliability.
2.5 Conclusions
Measurement of willingness to pay for an increased internalization of the risks em-
anating from nuclear power plants is important for energy policy. One instrument
of internalization is extending coverage provided by mandatory liability insurance
for plant operators. For all its popular appeal, such a proposal will face opposition
in parliament and by consumers since higher insurance premiums lead to higher
electricity prices.
This study seeks to determine how much Swiss citizens value increased finan-
cial security through increased insurance coverage in case of an accident by using
the economic concept of marginal willingness to pay for (financial) security.
Since additional coverage is not available to individual consumers, a ‘stated
choice’ experiment was carried out, in which respondents decide in favor of or
against an alternative to the status quo, characterized by several attributes of elec-
tricity. These attributes are varied throughout the experiment, in contradistinction
26
How Much Internalization of Nuclear Risk Through Liability Insurance?
to conventional ‘contingent valuation’ approaches. The relevant attributes were
established by means of three pretests and turned out to be electricity price, fre-
quency of blackouts, waste disposal, maximum possible loss in case of an accident,
and insurance coverage. The econometric analysis confirms this selection, since all
attributes are estimated to be statistically significant arguments of the underlying
utility function. Average marginal willingness to pay for an additional percentage
point of compensation for losses in excess of the status quo amounts to some 0.16
US cents per kwh (median value 0.14 cents), approaching zero when insurance
coverage goes towards 100 percent.
Specifically, an increase of mandated liability insurance coverage from today’s
CHF 0.7 bn. (US$ 0.47 bn.) to CHF 4 bn. (US$ 2.7 bn.) would command a
WTP amounting to 0.40 US cents/kwh. This can be compared to an estimate of
additional cost. In a companion study, a log-logistic density function for nuclear
damages (i.e. the loss function for nuclear insurers) was calibrated. According
to that study, an increase of liability insurance from today’s CHF 0.7 bn. (US$
0.47 bn.) to CHF 4 bn. (US$ 2.7 bn.) would result in an increase in the price
of electricity of 0.008 US cents/kwh (Zweifel and Umbricht, 2002, table 4.16).
Therefore, quintuplicating current insurance coverage could lead to a welfare gain
for the majority of Swiss citizens.
This proposition has to be qualified in several ways. On the cost side, the choice
of the distribution law can be criticized. Indeed, a different choice (Gamma e.g.)
would entail somewhat changed marginal cost estimates. On the benefits side in-
vestigated here, one has to accept the fact that no thought experiment can simulate
the actual decision environment completely. In particular there is no guarantee that
participants take described damages seriously and do not speculate on the govern-
ment providing financial assistance to victims in case of a major accident2. On the
other hand, estimated values of marginal willingness to pay do exhibit theoretically
plausible variations in several dimensions, thus providing a measure of support for
the validity of the experiment.
2In fact it is almost certain that the government will step in, as recent much less severe events
have shown (e.g. the bailout of Swiss Airlines Ltd in 2002).
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Contextual Information Provided for the Interview
DamagesCaused by Accidents in Power Plants
Power plants can cause great damage in case of an accident. In case of a severe
accident in a nuclear power plant, a large part of the resident population needs to
be evacuated. Acute disease and death may occur in the vicinity of the power plant.
However, only few deaths are expected as a rule. With considerable
delay, an accident may affect remote areas in that entire regions
suffer from radiation and may partially become uninhabitable for
years.
The probability of such an accident is very small.
Breaches of hydro dams are somewhat more frequent. However, their probability is
low as well.
A sudden breach of a dam releases a huge flood wave. Affected individuals
cannot be warned in time, and thousands of them may die. In most cases however,
there is enough time to warn residents, permitting the great majority of them to be
evacuated. The immediate risk is limited to people on the downstream side of the
dam. Most damages are repaired within a year after the accident. However, the
natural environment may take several years to recover. At any rate, damages to man
and nature are massive.
Today already, operators of nuclear power plant are mandated to buy insurance that
pays in case of damage. However, insurance covers only part of the possible loss.
It is an open question as to who would be responsible for the uncovered remainder.
Federal parliament would decide on the issue. Therefore, there is no guarantee that
victims are fully compensated. The uncovered remainder of the damage may easily
exceed Switzerland's annual tax revenue.
In order to better secure compensation of victims the law could stipulate an
extension of insurance coverage. In this way a greater part of possible damage
would be paid by insurers covering power plants. This would have the advantage of
providing improved financial protection to victims. In addition, this could be an
incentive for power plant operators to invest even more in the safety of their plant.
On the other hand, an extension of insurance coverage would increase the cost of
operation of power plants, resulting in higher prices for electricity to consumers.
Pros and Cons of Nuclear Power
In the current debate, the following advantages of nuclear power are often
mentioned:
§ produces a great deal of electric power
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2.6.2 Risk Estimate
Method used in the questionnaire to elicit the subjective risk estimates for nuclear
and hydro accidents respectively. The respondents had to mark their own risk esti-
mate in one of the boxes.
Subjectiveprobability of large-scale nuclear accident:
Subjective probability of dam failure (hydro):
Experts’ estimate
every
100
years
every
1,000
years
every
10,000
years
every
years
every
1 mn.
years
every
10 mn.
years
every
100 mn.
years
every
1,000 mn.
years
-2 -1 0-1.5 -0.5 1 2 3 4 50.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5
Experts’ estimate
every
100
years
every
1,000
years
every
10,000
years
every
100,000
years
every
1 mn.
years
every
10 mn.
years
every
100 mn.
years
every
1,000 mn.
years
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3-3.5 -2.5 -1.5 -0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5
mn. = million
2.6.3 Gosset Code Used to Construct Reduced Design
The experimental design was constructed using the program ‘Gosset’ by Hardin
and Sloane. For more information on ‘Gosset’ see Hardin and Sloane (1993) and
Hardin and Sloane (1994).
10 discrete price 0 10 30 60 20 discrete blk 0 1 30 discrete wst 0 1 40
discrete dam1 dam2 dam3 cov1 cov2 cov3 0 1 50 range dam4 cov4 0 1
60 constraint
dam1+dam2+dam3+dam4=1 70 constraint cov1+cov2+cov3+cov4=1 80 model
(1+price+blk+wst+dam1+dam2+dam3+dam4+cov1+cov2+cov3+cov4)^2
+ price^3-blk^2-wst^2-dam1^2-dam2^2-dam3^2-dam4^2
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- cov1^2-cov2^2-cov3^2-cov4^2
design type=D n=50
2.6.4 Complete Estimation Results
Variables Coefficient S.E.
many blackouts (blackouts) -0.26656** 0.09293
unresolved waste disposal problems (waste) -0.67369** 0.09702
damage in 100 bn. CHF (damage) 0.06612 0.15924
insurance coverage in percent (coverage) 0.01416** 0.00329
disposable income in CHF 000s (income) 2.9755* 1.4302
income2 0.0228 0.0142
damage2 -0.2320** 0.0794
coverage2 -0.00009** 0.00003
damage*coverage 0.0342** 0.0106
damage*waste 0.1145 0.0771
damage*blackouts -0.0364 0.0718
coverage*waste 0.0012 0.0015
coverage*blackouts -0.0036* 0.0016
noincome (= -outlay in CHF 000s) -4.0500 2.8300
no income2 (equal to outlay2) 0.4740 1.0200
(pessimistic beliefs) * income -1.0153 0.6523
(pessimistic beliefs) * income2 0.0051 0.0031
(pessimistic beliefs) * noincome 0.0813 0.3305
(medium level of education)*income -1.2353 1.1717
(medium level of education)*income2 -0.0239+ 0.0136
(medium level of education)*noincome -1.0342 2.1487
(medium level of education)*noincome2 0.5970 0.7770
continued...
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...concluded
Variables Coefficient S.E.
(high level of education)*income -6.7719** 1.6609
(high level of education)*income2 -0.0066 0.0146
(high level of education)*noincome 1.0015 2.2493
(high level of education)*noincome2 0.0724 0.7700
age*income 0.0480* 0.0211
age*income2 -0.0002+ 0.0001
age*noincome -0.0041 0.0382
age*noincome2 0.00000 0.0134
female*income 0.0338 0.6020
female*income2 0.0029 0.0032
female*noincome 0.4417 1.1221
female*noincome2 -0.4410 0.3820
constant 0.22319+ 0.13173
Observations 4119
Number of individuals 375
Log likelihood -1959.67
Log likelihood constant only -2326.77
ρ 0.5425
ση 1.0890
+ significant at 10%,* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.
Note: Since income is equal to stated income minus outlay
on electricity, noincome =−outlay.
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Chapter 3
Spatial Effects in
Willingness-to-Pay: The Case of
Nuclear Risks
3.1 Introduction
This paper examines the spatial dimension of responses to the external effects
of nuclear power. Most people would agree that these effects decrease - ceteris
paribus - with distance from a nuclear power plant. They would therefore expect
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for coverage against the financial risks of a nuclear acci-
dent to decrease with distance from plant. However, ’ceteris paribus’ may not hold
because homeowners and tenants can choose where to locate. If those who believe
to be little affected by the externality settle in the vicinity of the plant, WTP for
financial safety may well increase rather than decrease with distance. Still another
spatial relationship is predicted for waste disposal, a second externality associated
with nuclear power. As long as the (national) site of waste disposal is not deter-
mined yet but could be anywhere in the country where geological conditions are
favorable, putting more distance between the plant and one’s residence does not
make much of a difference. Thus, WTP for getting rid of this externality is pre-
dicted to have no relation with distance (except in the very neighborhood of the
plant, where all eligible train lines and truck routes necessarily originate).
The present study purports to test these predictions using data from a stated
choice experiment (SCE) with Swiss individuals. It is of particular interest for two
reasons. First, most of the existing published work concerned with the effect of
distance on the WTP for reducing a negative externality focuses on housing prices.
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By way of contrast, this contribution reports on WTP values derived from market
experiments yielding measurements of demand uncontaminated by supply condi-
tions. Second, the evidence comes from Switzerland, a country where residents
have been having full opportunity to choose their location in response to nuclear
externalities. As noted above however, such a relocation usually proves ineffective
when it comes to escaping nuclear waste; in fact, Switzerland does not yet have
a long-term repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste . A
large fraction of nuclear material is kept at the respective power plants before being
shipped to either France or Great Britain.
The SCE was conducted in 2001. Some 370 respondents were asked to choose
between the status quo and an alternative type of electricity, defined by a changed
number of blackouts, problems with the disposal of nuclear waste, severity of (fi-
nancial) damage in case of accident, and degree of coverage through mandatory
liability insurance carried by nuclear plant operators.
At present, operators are obliged to insure for CHF 1 billion (bn.) (approx.
US$ 0.8 bn. [US$ 1 ≈ CHF 1.25 at 2003 exchange rates]), an amount that will
hardly be sufficient to compensate the victims of a major accident. However, an
extension of coverage will c.p. result in higher consumer prices for electricity. This
also holds true for any conceivable solution to the problem of nuclear waste, since
in Switzerland 35 percent of electricity is provided through nuclear power (most of
the remainder comes from hydro power).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After a review of the
literature dealing with the spatial effects of externalities associated with nuclear
power, section 3.3 describes the SCE that was applied to measure WTP of the Swiss
population for reducing these externalities. Section 3.4 develops the hypotheses
to be tested, mainly with regard to the effect of distance on measured WTP. The
econometric specification, based on the Random Utility Model, is presented in
section 3.5. Estimation results and hypothesis tests follow in section 3.6, while
concluding remarks are offered in section 3.7.
3.2 Review of the Literature
Choosing one’s optimal location with respect to the risk of being affected by an
externality can be viewed as self-insurance. By locating farther away from a nu-
clear power plant, individuals reduce their losses e.g. due to radiation in case of a
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severe accident. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) analyze the effect of the simultaneous
availability of self-insurance and market insurance and conclude that both ’tech-
nologies’ are substitutes as long as the price of market insurance is independent of
the amount of self-insurance.
Since up to now it has not been possible for Swiss citizens to buy insurance
against nuclear risks, the only option available is self-insurance. In the absence
of an insurance market, the optimal level of self-insurance thus increases with in-
creased risk aversion (see for instance Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985). Therefore,
more strongly risk-averse individuals are predicted to spend more resources on loss
mitigation than less risk-averse consumers.
The experiment conducted in the present study introduces a hypothetical in-
surance market. Respondents in this experiment evidently state their WTP for nu-
clear insurance after having set their optimal level of self-insurance through their
residential choice. Although there is no need to account for strategic interaction
between market insurance and self-insurance (Kelly and Kleffner, 2003), it is nec-
essary to account for self-insurance that has taken place prior to the experiment.
Thus, estimated WTP for insurance coverage is expected to vary systematically
with the degree of self-insurance, i. e. residential location in the present context.
There is a large body of empirical work estimating the effect of proximity to
a source of disamenity on property values. The case of nuclear power plants was
first studied by Nelson (1981) and Gamble and Downing (1982). In the wake of the
1979 incident at Three Mile Island, they find weak or even reversed distance effects,
viz. higher property values in the vicinity of the plant. Folland and Hough (2000)
extend their focus beyond a single power plant, analyzing a panel data set of broad
market areas across the United States. Their evidence points to a negative impact
of nuclear power plants on land prices, with distance again having an ambiguous
effect.
However, Gawande and Jenkins-Smith (2001) find that being five miles away
from a nuclear waste shipment route was associated with a 3 percent increase of
average house value compared to property on the route.
While important, nuclear power is only one of several sources of disamenities.
In their review, Gawande and Jenkins-Smith (2001) conclude that a wide range of
disamenities such as superfund sites and polluted water negatively influence the
value of residential property. More specifically Faber (1998), collecting evidence
on the effects of distance, finds that their magnitude depends on the type of facil-
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ity, community characteristics, and setting (rural or urban). Chemical refineries
and nuclear power plants seem to have roughly comparable (positive) gradients,
amounting to $200-300 per mile of distance (in 1993 dollars). Compared to other
facilities, this is a rather small effect, as a proposed radioactive waste disposal site
was associated with a gradient of $4,440 per mile. As Clark and Allison (1999)
found in their study, the distance effect weakens over time, suggesting that reloca-
tion of individuals may replenish demand for property close to the source of the
externality by those who believe to be little affected, a consideration taken up in
section 3.4.
Most of these studies rely on hedonic modeling, linking price data to a set of
characteristics of real estate property. Davis (2005) applies this method to estimate
marginal WTP to avoid pediatric leukemia risk. As he points out, the heterogene-
ity of individuals (with respect to income or preferences in general) contaminates
housing price data. Furthermore, the cost of changing location, which constitutes
the cost of this particular self-insurance technology, is arguably not trivial. More-
over, market prices also depend on supply which in turn is affected by zoning laws
and building regulations. For these reasons, estimates of individual WTP derived
from analyzing the compensating differentials contained in market data are po-
tentially distorted and incomplete. Experimental evidence may thus complement
information gleaned from market data.
For example, Smith and Desvousges (1986) analyze the impact of a waste dis-
posal facility on the subjective value of a residential site using a contingent valu-
ation experiment. For hazardous waste, they obtain a positive distance gradient of
$330-$495 per mile. A study related to the present paper is by Riddel et al. (2003),
who estimate the effect of several planned nuclear waste transportation routes from
power plants to the Yucca Mountain (Nevada) repository. They find evidence that
perceived risk decreases with distance to the planned transportation route and that
higher perceived risk results in a higher probability of moving away from the route.
As opposed to Riddel et al. (2003), this study does not consider a planned and
not yet effected change in the environment. Rather, it seeks to measure WTP for
a reduction of two risks emanating from nuclear power plants that have been ef-
fective for at least two decades. Respondents had ample opportunity to relocate
according to their preferences regarding nuclear power plants. The present investi-
gation therefore estimates the net disutility caused by nuclear power plants, given
the respondents’ amount of self-insurance through locational choice.
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Attribute Levels (Codingc) Unit Status quo
price 0; 10; 30; 60 (0;...;60) percent 0
blackouts 2; 14 (0;1) numb./year 2
nowaste unresolved problems (1); unresolved
no unresolved problems (0) problems
damage
a 0.1; 10; 100; 200 (0.1;...;200) CHF bn. 200
coverage
b 1; 20; 50; 100 (1;...;100) percent 1
a Values in US$ bn: 0.065; 6.5; 65; 130 (at 2002 exchange rates)
b Coverage in percent of loss
c Bold for status quo
Table 3.1: Levels of attributes.
3.3 The Stated Choice Experiment
3.3.1 Methodology
In stated choice experiments (SCE), respondents are confronted with hypothetical
choice situations where they have to decide whether they prefer the status quo or
some alternative product that is allowed to differ in all product attributes. For each
such choice set, respondents have to indicate their preferred choice, which requires
them to trade off one set of attributes against the other, implicitly revealing their
preferences regarding the different attributes.
The SCE alternative started with McFadden (1974) and was further developed
by Louviere and Hensher (1982). More recently, it has become popular in en-
ergy and health economics (Johnson and Desvousges, 1997; Johnson et al., 1998;
Telser and Zweifel, 2002). In the context of nuclear energy risks, SCE have been
found to yield qualitatively and quantitatively plausible results (Schneider and Zweifel,
2004). However, that study neglected the spatial dimension of risk associated both
with the operation and waste disposal of nuclear plants.
3.3.2 Experimental Design
In the present context, the ’stated choice’ method allows individuals to choose
among different types of electricity. During the decision process, the attributes
(among them price) of electricity are traded off against each other. Participants in
the experiment are asked to pairwise evaluate several different electricity products
by indicating their preferred choice. By observing a number of choices, it is pos-
sible to approximate an indifference curve in attribute space and therefore estimate
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Description Mean Median Std.
distance distance in kilometers from respondents 45 36 30
residence to nearest nuclear power plant
pessimist = 1 if respondent considered a nuclear 0.59 1 0.49
accident at least ten times more probable
than experts
opponent= 1 if respondent said to be against 0.21 0 0.41
nuclear energy even if there was no waste
disposal problem
owner = 1 if respondent owns his or her dwelling 0.35 0 0.48
sexm = 1 if respondent is male, = 0 if female 0.52 1 0.5
income yearly income in CHF. Seven income 47,500 60,000 35,400
categories were used in the questionnaire.
44 percent did not reveal their income
inc_missg= 1 if income was missing 0.44 0 0.5
Table 3.2: Sample description of explanatory variables.
how much income (through higher electricity prices) respondents are prepared to
give up in return for an increased amount of some other desired attribute.
For a SCE, it is necessary to define the product under consideration (here: elec-
tricity) by but a few relevant attributes. In a telephone survey preceding the main
survey, 500 Swiss residents were asked to indicate how important they considered
several electricity attributes. The following five emerged as the most important:
size of area exposed to hazard (damage), secure and sustainable waste disposal
(nowaste), reliability (blackout, low frequency of blackouts), financial compensa-
tion of victims in case of an accident (coverage), and average price per kwh (price).
Since the study is concerned with insurance against financial risks of a nuclear ac-
cident, damage was defined as billions of CHF at risk rather than area exposed to
hazard. The relevant attributes are summarized in Table 3.1.
The questionnaire for the main survey was divided in three parts: warm-up
questions, the actual choice experiment, and socioeconomic information. In the
first part, data on monthly electricity outlay, attitudes towards nuclear energy, and
the importance of choice between different types of electricity was collected. Re-
spondents then had to read a description of the risks of nuclear and hydro power
plants (see the appendix for exact wording). Emphasis was put on possible worst-
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case scenarios and their financial consequences. Respondents were also told that
nuclear power plants were already mandated to have liability insurance but that
coverage fell far short of possible financial loss in case of a major accident. The
government would possibly provide relief by imposing a special tax. Alternatively,
mandated insurance coverage could be stepped up to reduce reliance on the tax
system.
The second part of the questionnaire consisted of the actual DCE. Respon-
dents were confronted with 14 different choice situations where they had to decide
whether they preferred a proposed type of power to the status quo. Note that re-
spondents could always opt out by stating "cannot decide". In the third and last
part of the questionnaire, standard socioeconomic data was collected, summarized
in Table 3.2. Specifically, distance from the nearest nuclear power plant was calcu-
lated using Zip codes provided by respondents. pessimist=1 obtains if on a visual
analog scale, respondents marked their estimated accident probability at least one
order of magnitude higher than experts.
Face-to-face interviews were performed in the German-speaking part of Switzer-
land during September and October 2001 (in the aftermath of 9/11). In total, 391
persons were interviewed: Each respondent evaluated 14 choice scenarios, result-
ing in 5,474 recorded decisions. After excluding "cannot decide" answers and
missing values, a total of 4,613 observations were retained.
3.4 Expected Effects of Distance on Willingness-to-Pay
3.4.1 The Confounding Effect of Locational Choice
Given the possibility of choosing residential location according to attitudes towards
nuclear power plants, one would expect respondents to be sorted according to dis-
tance to nuclear power plants, with the more skeptical types to be found farther
away from the plant. Therefore, people located farther away from the plant might
be willing to pay more for additional insurance coverage than those located in the
vicinity of the plant. Whether the distance gradient of WTP for risk reduction is
positive or negative thus depends on the degree of sorting that took place. For
without sorting, living farther away from the plant does serve as self-insurance,
reducing the risk of radiation and causing a lowered WTP for coverage of financial
loss.
Since the cost of relocating is not trivial, sorting is expected to be less than per-
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fect. Thus, the combined effect of self-insurance and sorting is ambiguous. How-
ever, to the extent that estimation succeeds in controlling for attitude and perceived
risk, the distance gradient should be negative, i.e. WTP for additional insurance
coverage should decrease with distance from plants.
Three indicators for respondents’ attitude towards nuclear power plant are used
in the estimation, (1) whether they perceive nuclear accidents to be much more
likely than experts’ best estimates (pessimist), (2) whether they state to be opposed
to nuclear energy in principle (opponent), and (3) male sex (sexm). The last in-
dicator is based on several studies. Hartog et al. (2002) analyze the influence of
individual characteristics on risk aversion and find survey evidence that men are
less risk-averse than women. Nielsen et al. (2003) present evidence that men have
a lower perception of risks than women. sexm is therefore predicted to display a
negative relationship with WTP. Furthermore, to the extent that locational deci-
sions concerning residence more strongly reflect main breadwinners’ preferences
(who are still predominantly men in Switzerland), interacting sexm with distance
controls for sorting. Thus, the net effect of distance on WTP is predicted to be less
strongly negative for men than women.
3.4.2 The Difference Between Radiation and Waste Disposal Risks
The risk of nuclear waste disposal differs importantly from that of plant operation.
In view of the fact that a national site for nuclear waste disposal has not been
designated yet, putting more distance between one’s residence and a nuclear plant
has little effect. Therefore, distance should not be a relevant predictor of WTP for
solving the problem of nuclear waste (WT PW). This statement needs to be qualified
in the following way. For geological reasons, a future disposal site is unlikely to
be near existing plants (which are all located on rivers). Therefore, being located
at a great distance to the plant does not protect individuals from the risk associated
with the shipping and disposal of nuclear waste. Yet transports of radioactive waste
and spent fuel necessarily originate from plants, from where they will be directed
to whatever national disposal site will be chosen (at present, destinations are Le
Hague in France and Sellafield in Great Britain). This implies that there is and will
be an increased exposure to the risk of nuclear waste in the vicinity of the plant.
For most values of distance, however, the effect of distance on WT PW is expected
to be zero.
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3.4.3 Hypotheses to Be Tested
The preceding arguments may be summed up as follows. (1) Marginal WTP for
higher liability insurance coverage (MWPC) may decrease or increase with dis-
tance from the nearest nuclear plant, depending on whether the direct effect of
distance (risk effect) or the sorting effect prevails. (2) By controlling for respon-
dents’ attitude, parts of the pure risk effect can be estimated and is expected to be
negative. (3) WTP for solving the waste problem (WT PW) is predicted not to de-
pend on distance. (4) Ceteris paribus, increasing values of MWPC and WPTW are
expected with higher income since the marginal utility loss caused by an increase
in the price of power should be decreasing in income. Since some 40 percent of
respondents refused to indicate their income, restricting the sample to those indi-
viduals with information on income has to be avoided. The solution retained is
to equate missing values to zero (income = 0) while creating a dummy variable
inc_missg that takes on the value of one if income information is not available. In-
teraction terms are limited to outlay; this is sufficient to represent differences in
marginal utility of income.
3.5 Econometric Specification
An individual may be confronted with a discrete choice, e.g. whether to buy a
certain product or not. Given this choice, individuals maximize their utility with
respect to their budget constraints, obtaining certain utility values. These values
define an indirect utility function (conditional on the alternative selected) that de-
pends on individuals’ characteristics, their incomes, on the particular attributes of
the alternative (including price) as well as on various unobservable and therefore
random effects (random utility specification, see McFadden, 2001).
In the present stated choice experiment (SCE), respondents were confronted
with 14 binary choice situations, involving the status quo and an alternative. The
dependent variable yi equals to one if respondents chose the alternative and zero if
they stayed with the status quo. Respondent i’s utility of the alternative in choice
situation j is denoted by Vi j; the one of the status quo, by Vm j. Respondents there-
fore chose the alternative (yi = 1) if Vi j − Vim ≥ 0. The utility function to be
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estimated thus reads
Vi j = β0 + β1 · coverage j + β2 · nowaste j + β3 · blackout j + β4 · damage j
+ β5 · outlay j + β6 · outlay2j + β7 · disti · coverage j + β8 · disti · nowaste j
+ β9 · disti · damage j + β13 · disti · pessi · coverage j + β34 · incomei · outlay j
+ . . . + ǫi j, (3.1)
where ǫi j = µi + νi j has a two-way random specification to account for the fact
that the same individual i decides in the several situations j. Note that incomei·
outlay j and outlay2j permit marginal utility of income to vary with income (since
∆outlay j = −∆incomei). Since only differences Vi j − Vim are relevant for an in-
dividual’s decision, regressors such as outlay j are measured as differences from
the status quo, causing socioeconomic variables to drop out of the equation unless
interacted with regressors that vary between situations, at least under the random
utility specification. The random effects probit model was estimated using max-
imum likelihood. The estimated utility function, , permits to calculate marginal
WTP for the different product attributes, defined as the marginal utility of the at-
tribute divided by the marginal utility of income,
MWPi(coverage) := ∂
ˆVi/∂coverage
∂ ˆVi/∂outlay
(3.2)
In the case of WTP for solving the nuclear waste problem, one has
WPi(nowaste) :=
ˆVi[nowaste = 1] − ˆVi[nowaste = 0]
∂ ˆVi/∂outlay
. (3.3)
MWP values reported are in US$ per year. Using the delta method (see Greene,
2003, p.70), standard errors of MWP are derived using the standard errors of the
parameters contained in the estimated utility function.
3.6 Results
Selected estimation results are displayed in Table 3.3 (full results are relegated to
the appendix). All coefficients of product attributes (coverage, nowaste, black-
out, outlay, outlay2) with the exception of damage show the expected sign and
are highly significant, indicating that respondents were (on average) willing to
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Signa) Coefficient Std.Err. z
coverage + β1 0.009887 *** 0.002264 4.37
nowaste + β2 0.516774 *** 0.168756 3.06
blackout - β3 -0.362759 *** 0.049799 -7.28
damage - β4 0.001445 0.000939 1.54
outlay - β5 -0.003341 *** 0.000303 -11.04
outlay2 + β6 1.19E-07 *** 0.000000 11.06
dist·coverage - β7 -1.03E-04 ** 0.000042 -2.47
dist·nowaste 0 β8 -0.001138 0.003068 -0.37
dist·sexm·coverage ? β10 1.54E-04 *** 0.000044 3.47
dist·sexm·nowaste 0 β11 0.005323 0.003347 1.59
dist·pess·coverage + β13 1.22E-04 ** 0.000049 2.49
dist·pess·nowaste 0 β14 -0.0042 0.003589 -1.17
dist·opp·coverage + β16 -7.70E-05 0.00006 -1.29
dist·opp·nowaste 0 β17 0.002981 0.00452 0.66
sexm·coverage - β22 -0.008248 *** 0.002285 -3.61
sexm·nowaste - β23 -0.427121 ** 0.173976 -2.46
pess·coverage + β25 -0.005563 ** 0.002417 -2.3
pess·nowaste ? β26 0.285538 0.181611 1.57
opp·coverage + β28 0.00336 0.003009 1.12
opp·nowaste + β29 0.273641 0.224882 1.22
income·outlay + β34 7.19E-09 *** 0.000000 2.52
Log likelihood = -2,178.2026, N=4,613, 376 respondents
a) Theoreticall y expected sign.
Table 3.3: Selected estimation results. Dependent variable is the probability of
accepting the alternative type of power. Estimation results for the full equation
(containing 37 rather than 21 explanatory variables) are given in the appendix.
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make tradeoffs among the different attributes. Furthermore, the relative magni-
tudes of marginal utilities associated with product attributes are intuitively plausi-
ble. Note that coverage measures the increase in insurance coverage in percent-
age points, whereas nowaste is an all-or-nothing variable indicating whether or
not there are any problems regarding nuclear waste. Multiplying the coefficient
of coverage (0.001) by 100 for making it roughly comparable to that of nowaste
(0.52), one obtains 1.00, suggesting that the two attributes are valued similarly.
Moreover, there are first indications that the hypotheses formulated in section 3.4.3
may be confirmed. (1) While dist·coverage has a negative coefficient, the one of
dist·pess·coverage is positive, turning the overall effect of distance around. (2)
The effect of distance interacted with coverage again changes sign when further
interacted with opponent. (3) The coefficient of dist·nowaste is insignificant, in
contradistinction to that of dist·coverage. (4) Higher income mitigates the disutil-
ity caused by higher outlay on electricity, pointing to diminishing marginal utility
of income.
Therefore, respondents are not only concerned about the risks associated with
nuclear energy (coverage, nowaste) but also about the frequency of power outages
(blackout) and about the costs of electricity (outlay and outlay2), with the posi-
tive coefficient of outlay2 pointing to a diminishing marginal disutility of loss of
income and hence decreasing marginal utility of income.
3.6.1 The Effect of Attitudinal Variables on WTP
Using eq. (3.2), MWP is evaluated for different values of sexm and pessimist while
keeping the remaining variables at their median values. The results in Table 3.4
reproduce the well-known fact of women being more concerned with the well-
being of future generations than men. This was already borne out by the negative
coefficient of sexm·coverage in Table 3.3. Men (sexm=1) do not value both ad-
ditional insurance coverage and solving the waste disposal problem as much as
women (sexm=0). WTP values reported in Table 3.4 confirm this finding. Pes-
simistic women are willing to pay more than twice as much as comparable men
for a marginal increase in insurance coverage (1.47 US$/year compared to 0.62
US$/year) and roughly 50 percent more than men for solving the waste disposal
problem (182 US$/year compared to 111 US$/year). The relative differential is
less for non-pessimistic women w.r.t. coverage, viz. some 85 percent, but the
same (100 percent) w.r.t. waste disposal. This may be surprising at first sight.
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Value s.e. z
MWP∗)C
pessimistic men 0.6198 0.3660 1.6900
pessimistic women 1.4677 0.4031 3.6400
non-pessimistic men 1.0357 0.3706 2.8000
non-pessimistic women 1.8837 0.4085 4.6100
WT PW
pessimistic men 110.6924 27.8928 3.9700
pessimistic women 181.9186 31.7356 5.7300
non-pessimistic men 71.5003 28.5781 2.5000
non-pessimistic women 142.7264 31.0601 4.6000
*) percentage point, e.g. from 1 to 2 percent of maximum loss
Table 3.4: Marginal willingness-to-pay for increased coverage (MWPC) and for
solving the waste disposal problem (WT PW) evaluated at median distance (35km)
in US$ per year.
Respondents who perceive a nuclear accident to be at least ten times more proba-
ble than experts (pessimist=1) are expected to be willing to pay more for coverage
than non-pessimistic individuals. In fact, pessimist is the one item of the question-
naire permitting respondents who do not want to be openly against nuclear power
(opponent=1, chosen by only 21 percent, see Table3.2) to express their skepticism.
However, skeptical individuals likely are more concerned about the non-financial
risks associated with nuclear power such as the disposal of radiating waste. The
results in Table 3.4 thus suggest that pessimist more likely serves as an indicator of
individuals’ general attitude towards nuclear energy rather than of their perceived
accident probability. Therefore, it makes sense that their WTP for additional cov-
erage should be somewhat lower than that of non-pessimistic respondents, while
their WTP for the solution of the waste problem is much higher.
3.6.2 The Effect of Distance on WTP
Returning to Table 3.3 for estimation results, one can see that the hypotheses for-
mulated in 3.4.3 are confirmed. In keeping with hypothesis (1), the coefficient of
dist·coverage, reflecting the risk effect, is significantly negative. By way of con-
trast, the coefficient of dist·nowaste lacks significance, suggesting that WTP for
solving the waste problem does not depend on distance from the nearest nuclear
plant, as predicted by hypothesis (3).
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C. Non-pessimistic men
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D. Pessimistic men
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Figure 3.1: Trading off different product attributes.
Prediction (2) states that these rather clear-cut results are due to the fact that the
effect of sorting is controlled for by attitudinal variables in the regression. This in
turn means that pessimists should exhibit a smaller distance gradient w.r.t. MWP
for coverage. And indeed, dist·pess·coverage has a positive coefficient (+1.22E-4),
which even more than counterbalances the negative one of dist·coverage (-1.03E-
4). The same effect can be observed for men (who are hypothesized to decide
about residential location in a family), for dist·sexm·coverage also has a counter-
vailing positive coefficient, amounting to 1.54E-4. And while dist·opp·coverage
has a negative partial effect (-0.77E-4), it is not significant. However, hypothesis
(3) also states that sorting should not make a difference w.r.t. WTP for having
the waste problem resolved. Indeed, dist·sexm·nowaste, dist·pess·nowaste, and
dist·opp·nowaste all fail to attain statistical significance. Finally, prediction (4)
states that marginal WTP for safety is an increasing function of income because
of decreasing marginal utility of income. In Table 3.3, the negative coefficient of
outlay (and the much smaller coefficient of outlay2) indicate that the probability
of accepting the alternative to the status quo (and hence utility) decreases because
of the reduction in disposable income caused by outlay on electricity. However,
the positive coefficient of income·outlay means that this loss of utility weighs less
52
Spatial Effects in Willingness-to-Pay: The Case of Nuclear Risks
heavily when income is high. This certainly constitutes a sign of decreasing mar-
ginal utility derived from income. Moreover, the fact that inc_missg · outlay lacks
significance (see bottom of the table in the appendix) suggests that the 40 percent of
respondents who refused to provide information on their income (see section 3.4.3)
do not differ systematically from the others w.r.t. their marginal utility. Thus, hy-
pothesis (4) is confirmed as well.
Since the indicators sexm, pessimist, and opponent are designed to capture the
sorting effect, the WTP of non-pessimistic women not opposed to nuclear energy
(sexm=0, pessimist=0, opponent=0) represents the pure risk effect. By hypothe-
sis (2) of section 3.4.3, their WTP for more comprehensive insurance coverage
should be decreasing in distance from plant. Panel A of Figure 3.1 shows that
non-pessimistic women who do not oppose nuclear energy exhibit positive MWP
for coverage at small distances from plant. However, MWPC becomes indistin-
guishable from zero (at the 5 percent significance level) at 65 kilometers, turning
negative farther away.
Pessimistic women, by way of contrast, may be claimed to have sorted them-
selves away from nuclear plants, resulting in a slightly positive distance gradient of
MWP (which however itself is significantly positive only between 0 and 85 kilo-
meters, see panel B of Figure 3.1). Among pessimistic men, this positive gradient
is far more marked (panel D), in accordance with the view that they are the ones
who decide about residential location. Finally, non-pessimistic men (panel C) ex-
hibit a much weaker positive gradient than the pessimists of panel D, combined
with positive WTP for coverage between distance of 20 and 135 kilometers from
plant. The two groups seem to differ in terms of their sorting w.r.t. distance, in
accordance with hypothesis (1) of section 3.4.3.
By way of contrast, the distance gradients of WTP for solving the waste dis-
posal problems are flat in all cases (not shown). Evaluating WT PW it at median
sample values (which includes a remaining life expectancy of some 44 years for
women and discounting at 15 percent ), one obtains a lifetime WT PW of $1,087
for a distance of 35 kilometers. The hundredfold of MWP for insurance coverage
also corresponds to the full solution of a problem, this time the one of financial risk
associated with operation of the plant. In this case, lifetime WTP at a distance of
35 km amounts to $1,439, suggesting that (full) financial coverage is valued higher
than solving the waste disposal problem, at least by the Swiss population. For resi-
dents located at the power plant, lifetime WTP is maximum at $2,280. It decreases
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by $24 per km, or $15 per mile, much less than the $200 to 300 per mile reported
by Faber (1998) for the United States.
3.7 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of distance from nuclear plant
on the WTP for a reduction of two types of risk emanating from these plants, using
survey evidence. In the case of Switzerland, respondents had ample opportunity to
choose their residential location according to their preferences regarding nuclear
power. In the case of radioactive risk associated with the operation of a nuclear
plant, this causes distance to play an ambiguous role. If spatial sorting of individ-
uals is indeed important, one would expect to find more strongly concerned people
residing at a greater distance from plants. This could result in a positive rather than
negative distance gradient in their marginal WTP for risk reduction. In the case of
nuclear waste disposal, however, distance from plant is predicted to be irrelevant
as long as the final disposal site is not decided (as in Switzerland).
In a Stated Choice Experiment, with statistical inference based on the Random
Utility Model, the attributes of electric power (degree of coverage by nuclear lia-
bility insurance, solution of the waste problem, but also number of blackouts, size
of damage, and price of electricity) are found to be valued as hypothesized. More
importantly, distance proves to be a significant predictor of marginal WTP for in-
surance coverage but not of WTP for having the waste disposal problem solved.
Controlling for attitudes towards nuclear energy and nuclear sorting in space, the
distance gradient turns out to be significantly negative with regard to marginal WTP
for increased insurance coverage. Starting with WTP for full insurance coverage of
$2,280 at zero distance from nuclear power plants, WTP decreases by $24 per km
[$15 per mile, compared to $200 to 300 according to Faber (1998) for the United
States] and eventually falls to zero at a distance of 95 km.
In sum, this research suggests that distance from an environmental disamenity
may have unexpected effects on WTP for risk reduction. Data on housing prices,
being contaminated by regional supply shift effects, are unlikely to permit discov-
ering the demand effects caused by the sorting in space performed by individuals
when choosing their residential location.
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3.8 Appendix
Full estimation results. Dependent variable is the probability of accepting the
alternative type of power.
Coefficient Std.Err. z
coverage β1 0.009887 0.002264 4.37
nowaste β2 0.516774 0.168756 3.06
blackout β3 -0.362759 0.049799 -7.28
damage β4 0.001445 0.000939 1.54
outlay β5 -0.003341 0.000303 -11.04
outlay2 β6 1.19E-07 0.000000 11.06
dist·coverage β7 -0.000103 0.000042 -2.47
dist·nowaste β8 -0.001138 0.003068 -0.37
dist·dam β9 -0.00005 0.000016 -3.06
dist·sexm·coverage β10 0.000154 0.000044 3.47
dist·sexm·nowaste β11 0.005323 0.003347 1.59
dist·sexm·damage β12 0.000038 0.000018 2.1
dist·pess·coverage β13 0.000122 0.000049 2.49
dist·pess·nowaste β14 -0.0042 0.003589 -1.17
dist·pess·damage β15 -0.000029 0.000019 -1.47
dist·opp·coverage β16 -0.000077 0.00006 -1.29
dist·opp·nowaste β17 0.002981 0.00452 0.66
dist·opp·damage β18 0.000092 0.000024 3.89
dist·own·coverage β19 -0.000055 0.00005 -1.11
dist·own·nowaste β20 0.006622 0.003738 1.77
dist·own·damagee β21 0.000031 0.00002 1.51
sexm·coverage β22 -0.008248 0.002285 -3.61
sexm·nowaste β23 -0.427121 0.173976 -2.46
sexm·damage β24 -0.000822 0.00095 -0.86
pess·coverage β25 -0.005563 0.002417 -2.3
pess·nowaste β26 0.285538 0.181611 1.57
pess·damage β27 -0.000379 0.000987 -0.38
opp·coverage β28 0.00336 0.003009 1.12
opp·nowaste β29 0.273641 0.224882 1.22
opp·damage β30 -0.003633 0.001204 -3.02
owner·coverage β31 0.003946 0.002528 1.56
owner·nowaste β32 -0.167968 0.19344 -0.87
owner·damage β33 -0.002436 0.001071 -2.27
income·outlay β34 7.19E-09 0.000000 2.52
inc_missg·outlay β35 0.000601 0.000328 1.83
const β0 0.659389 0.08581 7.68
Log likelihood = -2,178.2026, N=4,613, 376 respondents 55
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Chapter 4
Switching Costs, Firm Size, and
Market Structure
4.1 Introduction
A bus trip from New York City to Boston is a fairly homogenous good. It takes
about four hours and twenty minutes and costs US$55 at the Greyhound/Peter Pan
desk and US$15 at the Fung-Wah desk.1 Similarly, a big cup of milk coffee in
the Big Cup Café on 8th Avenue in Manhattan costs US$3.60, while the largest
cup of café latte in the Starbucks café on the other side of the avenue is sold at
US$3.95.2 Most strikingly perhaps, the airfare for a return flight from Berlin to
Cologne-Bonn costs Euro 395 if one flies with Lufthansa and Euro 53 if one travels
with German Wings.3 What is the common feature of these three pricing patterns?
First, arguably homogenous goods are sold at, sometimes substantially, different
prices. Second, one of the sellers is a large firm that is more or less globally active
and known by almost every potential consumer, while the other seller is a small
1Prices are as of May 2005. If one buys the tickets online, one pays US$28-35 with Grey-
hound/Peter Pan and US$15 with Fung-Wah. Greyhound/Peter Pan trips begin in Midtown Manhat-
tan on 42nd street, while Fung-Wah trips start in Chinatown in Manhattan on Canal street. Both trips
end at Boston South station.
2Both cafés are between 21st and 22nd street. Prices are as of spring 2005.
3Sources: www.lufthansa.de and www.germanwings.com. We choose return flights because these
are cheaper than one-way tickets for major carriers such as Lufthansa. The price of the German
Wings return ticket is the sum of two one-way tickets. The date of booking was July 21, 2005.
Lufthansa’s airport in Berlin is Tegel, while German Wings flies from and to Berlin Schönefeld. For
an outbound flight from Berlin to Cologne-Bonn, we arbitrarily chose July 28 round 8 a.m. For the
return flight, we chose August, 1, round 7 p.m. Though the price differences vary as a function of
various factors such as date and flexibility, there can be little doubt that German Wings is substantially
cheaper than Lufthansa. Moreover, the fact that German Wings is a partner of Lufthansa does not
refute that the two carriers set different prices and face different demand functions.
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local firm that is most probably only known by customers familiar with the locality.
Third, the large firm charges the high price.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a parsimonious model that explains
pricing patterns such as these. As the larger firms sell at higher prices, it is clear
from the outset that economies of scale cannot explain these patterns. What seems
to be at work here is a non-convexity in the consumption technology. Potential
customers of local firms must first learn about the existence of the local provider.
Once they know this, they have to experiment whether the goods and services pro-
vided by the local store suit their preferences, and eventually have to learn how to
best consume these. If this type of search and experimentation is costly, buying
from a new provider involves set-up costs. Thus, these set-up costs are a kind of
switching costs.
Of course, the same is true for new customers of global firms, or chain stores,
as we call them. The twist, though, is that if customers are mobile and consume
repeatedly, they have to incur the set-up cost only once when buying from the
chain store, whereas these costs have to be borne each time they buy from another
local store. Moving from one location to the other with an exogenous probability,
consumers cannot always buy from the same local firm. Consequently, they risk to
incur the set-up costs anew when first buying from a local firm. Since chain stores
help consumers save switching costs, they may be able to charge higher prices and
yet to attract more customers than do local firms.
Put in a nutshell, this is the explanation our paper suggests. So as to back up
the intuition just outlined, we develop the following model. Consumers are located
in two identical cities and live for two periods. With a given probability, they move
from one city to the other after the first period. In each period, they can either buy
from a local store or from a chain store, which both supply the same good. Before
they buy from a given store for the first time, each consumer incurs a set-up cost.
While all consumers value the good in the same way and face the same probability
of moving, they are heterogenous with respect to the switching costs. We show that
in the unique equilibrium both types of stores are active. The chain store charges a
higher price and attracts more consumers than do local stores. Low switching cost
consumers buy from the local stores and high switching costs consumers buy from
the chain store. Moreover, the relative profitability of the chain store increases as
consumers become more mobile.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section relates
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the paper to the existing literature. Section 4.3 introduces the model. Section 4.4
analyzes the benchmark case with two local monopolies, while section 4.5 derives
the unique equilibrium for the market structure with two local stores competing
with a chain. Section 4.6 then shows that the market structure with a local store in
each city and a chain store active in both cities is the unique stable market structure
if there is a small, positive entry cost. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, the idea that larger firms may gain more customers
while charging higher prices than smaller firms merely because of consumers’
switching costs has not been fully recognized in the previous formal literature.
For example, Stahl (1982) notes that a merger of local stores to a chain store “ap-
pears exclusively connected to the input side of the retailing activity, that is, to the
exhaustion of economies of scale in purchasing and distributing inputs.”
Switching costs as understood in this paper are a short-cut to search and exper-
imentation costs à la Nelson (1970), where consumers have to search and experi-
ment so as to find their most preferred good. Insofar as our model does not allow
for dynamic price competition, it is in some contrast to a part of the switching
cost literature. For example, Klemperer (1987, 1995)’s major concern is with the
dynamic aspects of price competition when consumers are locked in with their sup-
plier due to switching costs, so that sellers are tempted to use ’bargains followed by
ripoffs’- pricing schemes (Farrell and Klemperer, 2004). However, our approach is
perfectly in line with von Weizsäcker (1984), whom we follow by assuming that
firms do not set different prices over time.
Two papers that deal with search costs but are not concerned with switching
costs are Stahl (1982) and Wolinsky (1983). Stahl illustrates how a model of
demand externalities creates a similar agglomeration effect. Wolinsky presents a
model where imperfect information creates the need to search for a suitable buy,
leading firms to cluster at one location in order to reduce search costs.
Baye and Morgan (2001) provide a model with equilibrium dispersion of pub-
licized prices, which arise because some consumers decide not to bear the cost
required to become informed about prices.4 Insofar as in our model high switching
cost consumers prefer paying higher prices to bearing the switching cost, this is
4For empirical evidence, see Baye et al. (2004).
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very similar to our model. In the model of Baye and Morgan, though, the high
and low priced firms are not determined ex ante because the price dispersion stems
from a mixed strategy equilibrium. Consequently, in their model firm size does not
matter.
Because chain stores are physically differentiated from local stores in that they
are active in more locations than local stores, the paper also relates to the prod-
uct differentiation literature initiated by Hotelling (1929). Janssen et al. (2003)
study competition between two firms with multiple outlets (chain stores) on the
Salop (1979) circle, where firms sell differentiated products to heterogenous con-
sumers. In their model, outlets from the same chain are homogenous but outlets
across chains are heterogenous. Whereas Janssen et al. (2003) are concerned with
location and pricing decisions of two chains, we are interested in the effect of ho-
mogeneity of outlets from the same chain on consumer choice if alternatively they
can buy from heterogenous single outlet firms.
Aside from explaining the above mentioned price patterns, our model also pro-
vides a simple explanation for the remarkable asymmetry in firms size as observed,
e.g., in the retail and hotel industries because our model predicts the local stores’
market share is at most one third in equilibrium.5 For alternative explanations for
such asymmetries, see, e.g., Besanko and Doraszelski (2004), Athey and Schmutzler
(2001), Bagwell et al. (1997) and Hausman and Leibtag (2004).
4.3 The Model
There are two cities E (East) and W (West), each hosting one unit of risk neutral
consumers. Firms sell a homogenous product and each consumer is assumed to
bear exogenously given switching costs s ∈ [0, σ] prior to buying the good for
the first time in any given type of store. The timing of events is as illustrated in
Figure 4.1. After firms choose their prices at date zero, each consumer observes
the prices in his home city. Consumers then decide at t = 1 from which firm to buy
the good. At the intermediate stage, each consumer moves to the other city with an
exogenously given probability α ∈ (0, 1). Throughout it is assumed that consumers
and firms know this probability but that ex ante neither firms nor consumers know
5For retailing, see, e.g., Bagwell and Ramey (1994), Bagwell et al. (1997), Dinlersoz (2004) or
www.stores.org. According to the last source the sales of Wal-Mart, the largest retailer in the U.S.,
were approximately four times as large as those of the second ranked Home Depot in 2003. For
the hotel industry, Michael and Moore (1995) report that 39 percent of all sales are accounted for by
franchise chains.
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Figure 4.1: Time line.
whether a particular consumer will move between period one and two. Consumers
who move to the other city then learn the prices prevalent in this city.6 At date two,
regardless of whether the consumer still is in the same city or not, he decides again
from which firm to buy the good or whether not to buy at all. For simplicity, there
is no discounting of future payoffs.
Though for the purpose of a consistent illustration, we stick to the literal two-
city interpretation, the basic framework also applies to many other situations. For
example, if consumers commute within a metropolitan area, customers of retailers
will face problems that are very similar to those in the two-city interpretation. On
the other hand, it is also clear that only the literal interpretation is appropriate for
hotel chains.7
4.3.1 Interpretation of Switching Costs
The switching costs considered in this paper have the interpretation of a fixed cost
of consumption. This is easily understood if one considers two different supermar-
kets, each of whom sells a set of products (or brands) that at most partially overlaps
with those sold by its competitor. Assume also that each consumer can find his op-
timal consumption bundle in either one of the two supermarkets, but that finding
or putting together this consumption bundle involves a fixed cost s > 0, which
may be due to time spent searching for the products or to the (opportunity) cost of
6For simplicity, we assume that all consumers learn all prices in period two. But this is clearly
without any loss since the period two decisions of consumers who do not move are not affected by
the price of the local store in the other city.
7An additional or alternative interpretation is that α is the probability of a preference shock for
related goods, say, cosmetics. A chain store or brand like, e.g., NIVEA, can then insure consumers
against the cost of switching by offering several cosmetic products.
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experimenting with different products.8 If a consumer has invested s for one of the
two supermarkets, he will no longer be indifferent between the two supermarkets
though he would have been indifferent between the two ex ante. Thus, the fix cost
s is equivalent to a switching cost.
A similar reasoning applies in the case of hotels, although for hotels, search
costs for customers do typically not accrue when searching within a given estab-
lishment but when searching across different hotels in a given city. So as to mini-
mize search costs, a consumer who has found a suitable hotel that is part of a chain
in one city may want to go to a hotel belonging to the same chain when staying in
another city.
Viewing switching costs in this way also motivates the informational assump-
tion of the model. If consumers do not know what kind of stores to expect in a yet
unfamiliar city, they are quite probably also uncertain about the prices prevailing in
this city. Therefore, consumers only learn all prices in the other city after moving
to this city. However, if a chain store is present in their home city as well as in
the other city, consumers know exactly what prices to expect at the chain store in
the other city. A consumer deciding whether to buy at the local or chain store at
t = 1 thus knows the local store’s price in his home city and the chain store’s price
charged in both cities. He is, however, uncertain about the price of the local store
in the other city.
4.3.2 Consumers
There is a continuum of consumers with heterogenous switching costs. Con-
sumers’ switching costs s are uniformly distributed on [0, σ], so that the density is
f (s) = 1
σ
for 0 ≤ s ≤ σ and zero otherwise. The probability α ∈ (0, 1) of moving
to the other city in period two is independent of type s. Consumers decide at t = 1
and t = 2 whether to buy one unit of the good, thereby generating gross utility
u > σ or not to buy, in which case they get zero utility. A consumer who buys
twice from the same store at price p has net utility of (u − p − s) + (u − p), while a
consumer who buys from two different stores at prices p′ and p′′ gets a net utility
of (u − p′ − s) + (u − p′′ − s).
8Note that though consumers are modelled as homogenous with respect to utility generated by
consumption, this is without loss since the only thing that matters is that absent switching costs, each
consumer is indifferent between two different sellers if they set the same price.
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4.3.3 Firms
All firms have constant unit costs of production, which are normalized to zero.
This simplifying assumption allows to disentangle the effects of consumer mobility
and switching costs from the effects of increasing returns to scale. We assume
also that firms are committed to charge the same prices in both periods. There
are several possible and plausible justifications for this assumption. First, period
length may simply be too short to make changing prices worthwhile. For example,
if consumers commute and shop at different locations in a metropolitan area on a
daily basis, then changing prices from day to day will probably not be optimal for
retailers.9 Second, though this is not part of the present paper, one can imagine a
dynamic game where the number of newcomers in every period is sufficiently large,
so that the bargain-and-rip-off strategy of low initial and high second period prices
does not pay if, as seems realistic, new and old customers cannot be distinguished
(see also von Weizsäcker, 1984).10 Third, for industries where chains are important
the assumption of uniform prices over time seems to be more in accord with casual
empirical observations than bargain-and-rip-off pricing. Finally, uniform prices
make the analysis much more tractable. Though we have no definite results for
the alternative with time varying prices, we do not believe that the assumption of
uniform prices is in any way crucial for our main findings that chain stores are
profitable because they help mobile consumers to economize switching costs.
Firms are also restricted to charge the same price in all locations. This assump-
tion is obviously of no consequences for local stores. It is, however, restrictive
for chain stores. A chain could choose a low price in one city and a high price
in the other city in order to implement some kind of bargain-and-rip-off strategy.
In the present model, however, a bargain-and-rip-off strategy as experienced by
consumers, say, in W is also a rip-off-and-bargain strategy when viewed from the
perspective of consumers in E. For the case of perfect information, no pure strategy
equilibrium where the chain stores charge different prices in the two cities exists.
The only pure strategy equilibrium with perfect information is in symmetric prices,
but it exists only for a subset of α’s.11
9Clearly, this argument applies much less for hotel chains because of the arguably greater time
length that elapses between purchases.
10Note that old customers are very unlikely to reveal their type if as a ”reward” for this they have to
pay higher prices. However, if firms are patient enough, they may play alternating bargain-and-rip-off
strategies in equilibrium; see Farrell and Klemperer (2004).
11More precisely, the pure strategy equilibrium exists only for α < 0.35. The proof is available
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Figure 4.2: Demand faced by a local monopolist.
4.4 Local Monopolies
To set the stage for analyzing the role played by a chain store, the benchmark case
of a local monopolist in each city is considered first. When there are only local
stores, they cannot help consumers save switching costs. Because a consumer’s
decision to buy from a given store will only depend on this store’s price, each store
acts independently of the other one.
Consider the local store in k ∈ {E,W}. Throughout, we use −k to denote the
city other than k. A consumer s in k at t = 1 will choose to shop at this store if his
expected net utility exceeds his switching costs, i.e., if (2 − α)(u − plk) − s ≥ 0. If
the same consumer moves to the other city in t = 2, he will choose the local store
in −k, whenever u− pl
−k ≥ s. An analogous argument applies for consumer s in −k.
A generic local store charging price p is thus confronted with a demand function
consisting of three segments. If the local stores price is very low (i.e., lower than
u−σ), all consumers shop and total demand is 2, consisting of the 2−α consumers
from the original city and the fraction α who moves over from the other city.
If price is increased, then consumers who move over shop if and only if u −
p − s > 0 ⇔ s < u − p, while still all consumers from the original city shop, i.e.
2 − α. This amounts to a demand of (2 − α) + α(u − p)/σ, where 2 − α is overall
demand from the home city and α u−p
σ
is the mass of consumers who move and who
consume.
upon request.
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If price is increased further, then also some consumers from the original city
prefer not to shop at all. Consumers with (2 − α)(u − p) − s < 0 do not shop at all.
Total demand then amounts to (2 − α)(2 − α)(u − p)/σ + α(u − p)/σ. In sum, the
local store faces demand Q(p) with
Q(p) =

2 p ≤ u − σ
2 − α + α u−p
σ
u − σ < p ≤ u − 12−ασ[
(2 − α)2 + α
]
u−p
σ
u − 12−ασ < p ≤ u
(4.1)
Figure 4.2 provides an illustration. Optimal price is obtained by piecewise maxi-
mizing pQ(p).
First note that optimal price will never be lower than u − σ. Otherwise the
local store could increase its price without losing any customers. Consider next the
second segment of demand which applies for prices u−σ < p ≤ u− 12−ασ. It is easy
to see that the price elasticity of demand (defined negatively) is always greater than
minus one if u
σ
<
2(2−α)+α2
α(2−α) .
12 In this case, the local store always prefers a higher
price, thus driving price up to the upper bound of this segment, yielding
pˆ = u −
1
2 − α
σ
as optimal price and Q(pˆ) = (2−α)2+α2−α as quantity demanded.
If the elasticity of demand is always smaller than minus one,13 i.e., if u
σ
< 2+α
α
,
then price will be lowered until the lower bound for this segment, u−σ, is reached.
For values of u
σ
in between these two threshold values, optimal price is given by
the first order condition from maximizing profit, yielding
p∗ =
2 − α
α
1
2
σ +
1
2
u.
For the third segment of Q(p), the elasticity of demand is smaller than minus
one if u − 12−ασ >
1
2u ⇔
u
σ
> 22−α , in which case the optimal price is as low as
possible, i.e., is equal to the lower bound of the segment. Otherwise, the optimal
price is given by the first order condition on this segment, yielding
p∗ =
1
2
u.
12The elasticity is − α
σ
p
2−α+α u−pσ
, which is bigger than −1 if and only if u > 2p − σ
α
(2 − α). Since p
is at most u − 12−ασ, the right-hand side is not greater than 2u − ( 22−α + (2 − α))σ. Re-arranging and
simplifying yields the condition in the text.
13From the previous footnote, − α
σ
p
2−α+α u−pσ
< −1 ⇔ u < 2p − σ
α
(2 − α). Since p is at least u − σ,
the right-hand side is larger than 2(u − σ) − σ
α
(2 − α), whence the condition in the text is obtained
after some re-arranging.
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Summarizing, the optimal price p∗ is given by
p∗ =

u − σ 2+α
α
< u
σ
2−α
α
1
2σ +
1
2u
2(2−α)+α2
α(2−α) <
u
σ
≤ 2+α
α
u − 12−ασ
2
2−α <
u
σ
≤
2(2−α)+α2
α(2−α)
1
2 u 1 ≤
u
σ
≤ 22−α
. (4.2)
Welfare Given the zero-one-nature of consumption, maximum welfare with two
local monopolies is achieved when all consumers buy the good in both periods. The
price then only serves a distributional function, shifting rents from consumers to
firms. Note, however, that the local monopolists choose a price p∗ sufficiently low
to induce all consumers choose to buy the good in both periods only if u
σ
> 2+α
α
. In
all other cases, the local monopoly creates a welfare loss. If two local stores were
allowed in each city, then standard Bertrand competition would drive prices down
to zero and restore the welfare optimum. But this comes at the price of zero profits
for the firms involved and is thus not feasible under costly entry. In Section 4.6
below, we discuss market structure with costly entry in more detail.
4.5 Two Local Stores Compete with a Chain Store
The previous section analyzed equilibrium when a local monopolist serves con-
sumers in each city. The model is now extended by introducing a chain store that
operates an outlet in each city and competes with local stores. The game is outlined
in Figure 4.3. The advantage of patronizing the chain store instead of local stores is
that consumers can economize switching costs: Even if they move to the other city,
they can visit the chain store in the new city without incurring additional set-up or
switching costs if they have visited it in period one.
Let plk denote the price of the local store in city k ∈ {E,W} and p
c the chain
store’s price. Remember that consumers in k observe the price of the local store in
−k only at t = 2 but not at t = 1. Denote by E pl
−k consumers’ expected price of the
local store in −k from the perspective of consumers living in k at t = 1.
The game has one proper subgame, starting with consumers’ t = 2 buy-decision.
In t = 2, a consumer s who lived in city k at t = 1 has to decide which store to
patronize. At this point in time there is no uncertainty with respect to the relevant
prices. He will thus patronize the store offering him the lowest price net of switch-
ing costs. Clearly, net prices depend on whether he had to move to the other city
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Figure 4.3: Game with two local stores and a chain from the perspective of city k
consumers. C stands for the chain, Lk denotes the local store in city k, S k stands
for a representative consumer in k and N is for nature.
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(city −k) and whether he chose the local or the chain store at t = 1. Figure 4.4
summarizes consumer s’s optimal decision at t = 2.
Consider next what prices firms charge in equilibrium. If all firms charge the
same price, all consumers will choose to patronize the chain because it economizes
on expected switching costs, thus leaving local stores with zero profits. The next
lemma shows that the chain store charges a higher price than local store’s in equi-
librium.
Lemma 1. In any subgame perfect pure strategy equilibrium 0 < plk < pc < u for
k ∈ {E,W}.
Proof. We first show that 0 < plk < pc. Suppose that plk ≥ pc. Then nobody in
k chooses the local store in t = 1. In t = 2 new consumers arrive, who either
chose the chain or local store in −k at t = 1. Those who chose the local store
in −k will choose the chain in k since it is cheaper. The same reasoning applies
for the chain store customers from −k. The consumers who were already in k in
t = 1 all chose the chain store in t = 1 and will do so again in t = 2. In summary,
with plk ≥ p
c (assuming that everybody visits the chain in case of a tie) the local
store in k will have no customers at all. The only situation where this could be part
of an equilibrium is when prices are such that plk ≥ p
c = 0 because in this case
(and only in this case) the local store is indifferent between having customers and
having none. We now show that plk ≥ p
c = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. To see this,
note that s > 0 for a positive measure of consumers. Consequently, the chain can
make positive profits by setting a sufficiently small but positive price pc, so that it
attracts a positive measure of consumers. By setting a price somewhat smaller than
pc but still strictly positive, the local store attracts those consumers with very low
switching costs, so that it realizes positive profits. Hence, plk ≥ p
c cannot be.
We next show that pc < u. Consider first price setting by the chain. Suppose,
contrary to the statement in the lemma, that pc ≥ u. In this case, no consumer will
patronize the chain in t = 2. Given that consumers do not choose the chain in t = 2,
they will not choose the chain in t = 1 either. By setting its price above u the chain
thus makes zero profits. If a local store sets pl > 0, the chain can make positive
profit for sure by lowering its price just below min{pl, u}.

Lemma 1 shows that both firms will charge positive prices which are smaller
than maximal utility u. Charging a price of zero is not optimal because with a
72
Switching Costs, Firm Size, and Market Structure
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
ss
s
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u − s
u − s
u − s
u − s
u − s
u − s
u − s
u − s
u − s
u − s
u − s
u − s
nonenone
none
nonenone
none
pcpc
pc
pcpc
pc
plkp
l
k
plk
plk
plk
pl
−k
45◦45◦
45◦
45◦45◦
45◦
chainchain
chain
chainchain
chain
locallocal
local
locallocal
local
consumer stays in k consumer moves to −k
ch
a
in
in
k
lo
ca
l i
n
k
n
o
n
e
in
k
Figure 4.4: Consumer choice in period t = 2.
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positive mobility parameter α the two firms do no longer sell identical products
and can thus attract different consumers: Low switching cost consumers prefer
the local store while high switching cost consumers prefer the chain. Setting the
price above u is neither optimal because in this case, the respective store has no
customers at all.
With Lemma 1 restricting firms’ optimal price setting behavior, consumers op-
timal strategies can be narrowed down to three alternatives: (1) always choose the
chain. (2) always choose the local. (3) choose the local in t = 1 and when not
moved also in t = 2. If moved, do not shop at all. The following analysis proves
this claim.
Lemma 2. Whoever buys from the chain buys from it in both periods, whether he
moves or not.
Proof. Denote by V(x, y, z) the expected utility of a consumer who plays the strat-
egy (x, y, z), meaning "buy from x in t = 1, from y in t = 2 if not moved and from
z if moved" with x, y, z ∈ {0, c, l}, where 0 stands for not buying at all, c for buying
from the chain and l for buying from the local. The strategy of the proof is to show
that any strategy that contains at least one c and at most two c’s is dominated by a
strategy that does either contain no c or by the strategy (c, c, c).
First, it is straightforward to check that (c, c, c) dominates any strategy that
contains one or two c’s and 0 elsewhere because by Lemma 1, pc < u.
Second, one can show that buying from the chain only in t = 2 and from at
least one local in any other city or period is dominated by a strategy that does not
contain any c. The proof is immediate because one can replace any c that appears
in the strategy by an l: The switching cost is borne in either case, but the local’s
price is smaller.
Third, consider strategies where the chain is chosen in t = 1, but some lo-
cal is chosen in t = 2. The basic procedure of the proof is again the same: Re-
place any c by an l. Complications arise only when establishing that V(c, l, c) <
max{V(c, c, c),V(l, l, l)}. To see that this indeed holds, consider a consumer who is
initially in k and notice that
V(c, c, c) = 2(u − pc) − s > 2u − (1 + α)pc − (1 − α)plk − (2 − α)s = V(c, l, c)
⇔
s > pc − plk.
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On the other hand, V(c, l, c) =
2u − (1 + α)pc − (1 − α)plk − (2 − α)s > 2u − (2 − α)plk − αE pl−k − (1 + α)s = V(l, l, l)
⇔
(2α − 1)s > pc − plk + α(pc − E pl−k).
Since the summands on the right-hand side are positive by Lemma 1, the condition
requires s to be smaller than something negative for α < 12 , which cannot be. For
α > 12 , the condition reads
s >
1
2α − 1
(pc − plk) +
α
2α − 1
(pc − E pl−k).
A necessary condition for this condition to be satisfied is s > (pc − plk). But
if s > (pc − plk) holds, then V(c, c, c) > V(c, l, c) holds. Thus, either V(c, c, c) >
V(c, l, c) or V(l, l, l) > V(c, l, c). This completes the proof. 
Now, suppose that the consumer chose the local store in t = 1 (second row in
Figure 4.4). Since the chain is always more expensive than local stores (Lemma 1),
the chain will never be chosen in t = 2. Together with Lemma 2 this immediately
leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Consumers do not change type of stores from t = 1 to t = 2.
Proof. Local store customers do not switch to the chain store because plk < pc is
given by Lemma 1. According to Lemma 2, chain store customers never switch to
local stores. 
Due to Lemma 1, there will always be some consumers in each city choosing
the local store in t = 1 in any equilibrium. If some consumer s0 chooses to pa-
tronize the local store in t = 1, then so will any consumer with s ∈ [0, s0]. Since
according to Corollary 1, consumers do not switch the type of store between t = 1
and t = 2 and since according to Lemma 2, all consumers who choose the chain in
t = 1 will do so again in t = 2, there remain three relevant strategies for consumers
in k:
• always patronize local stores, (l, l, l), with payoff
Vk(l,l,l)(s) := (2 − α)(u − plk) − s + α(u − E pl−k − s),
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0 sk s σ
V(l,l,l)(s) V(c,c,c)(s) inactive
Figure 4.5: Partition of the set of consumers in k provided condition (4.3) does not
hold.
• patronize local store in k and patronize no store in −k if moved, (l, l, 0), with
payoff:
Vk(l,l,0)(s) := (2 − α)(u − plk) − s and
• always patronize the chain store, (c, c, c), with payoff:
Vk(c,c,c)(s) := (2 − α)(u − pc) − s + α(u − pc) = 2(u − pc) − s.
Note that if the strategy (l, l, 0) is the preferred strategy for consumer s, then it must
be true that Vk(l,l,0)(s) > Vk(c,c,c)(s), i.e.,
(2 − α)(pc − plk) > α(u − pc). (4.3)
Since this condition is independent of s, no consumer at all will choose the chain
store in k if it holds. Note that condition (4.3) can only hold in equilibrium, if
plk , p
l
−k. Otherwise, condition (4.3) holds for both cities and the chain has no
customers at all. This can only be an equilibrium if plk = p
l
−k = 0, contradicting
plk , p
l
−k.
Suppose that condition (4.3) does not hold. In this case the strategy to shop at
the local store as long as not moved (l, l, 0) is dominated by always choosing the
chain store (c, c, c). Consumers are thus divided into three groups. Low switching
cost consumers with s ≤ sk always choose local stores, where
sk :=
2 − α
α
(pc − plk) + (pc − E pl−k). (4.4)
Medium switching cost consumers with s ∈ (sk, s] always choose chain stores,
where
s := min {2(u − pc), σ} . (4.5)
High switching cost consumers with
s ∈ [s, σ]
76
Switching Costs, Firm Size, and Market Structure
do not shop at all; see Figure 4.5. The min-operator in (4.5) is necessary because
the support of s is [0, σ]. Notice that the set of high switching cost consumers who
do not shop can be empty.
In deriving the demand functions below, it is assumed that all consumers shop
(i.e., that this set is empty), implying s = σ. Proposition 1 shows that this is indeed
the case in equilibrium.
Given some prices pck ≤ p
c
, and E plk < p
c for both k, the local store in k thus
faces the demand function
Qlk := (2 − α)
1
σ
[
2 − α
α
(pc − plk) + (pc − E pl−k)
]
+α
1
σ
[
2 − α
α
(pc − pl
−k) + (pc − E plk)
]
.
(4.6)
Maximizing Qlk(plk)plk with respect to plk for both k yields the first order condition
for the local store in k
0 = 4pc − 2α(2 − α)E pl−k − α2E plk − 2(2 − α)2 plk with k = E,W. (4.7)
A local store’s best response function is
pl∗k
(
E plk, E p
l
−k
)
=
4pc − 2α(2 − α)E pl
−k − α
2E plk
2(2 − α)2 . (4.8)
The chain store faces demand
Qc(pc) :=
(
2 − Qlk
)
+
(
2 − Ql−k
)
(4.9)
and maximizes Qc(pc)pc with respect to pc. Its first order condition is
0 = −8pc + 2σα + (2 − α)plk + αE plk + (2 − α)pl−k + αE pl−k (4.10)
If a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in pure strategies exists, then con-
sumers’ expectation about the local store’s price in the other city must be correct,
i.e., equilibrium prices must be a solution to
E plk = p
l
k for k = E,W. (4.11)
The three first order conditions (4.7) for k = E,W and (4.10) and the two ex-
pectation consistency conditions (4.11) constitute a linear system of five equations
in pc, plk, p
l
−k, E p
l
k and E p
l
−k. The following proposition states that such an equi-
librium exists and that it is unique.
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Proposition 1. There exists a unique SPE in pure strategies. Equilibrium prices
are
pl∗ :=
α
(2 − α)2 + 2σ p
c∗ :=
α[(2 − α)2 + 4]
4[(2 − α)2 + 2]σ
with pl∗k = p
l∗
−k = p
l∗
. Equilibrium quantities and profits are, respectively,
Ql∗ := (2 − α)
2
(2 − α)2 + 2 Q
c∗ :=
2[(2 − α)2 + 4]
(2 − α)2 + 2
Πl∗ :=
α(2 − α)2
[(2 − α)2 + 2]2σ Π
c∗ :=
α[(2 − α)2 + 4]2
2[(2 − α)2 + 2]2 σ,
where Ql∗k = Ql∗−k = Ql∗ and Πl∗k = Πl∗−k = Πl∗.
Proof. Existence The system of five linear equations (4.7), (4.10) and (4.11) with
k = E,W has a unique solution, which is given by the prices in the proposition. At
these prices, all consumers shop in both cities. We thus have s∗ = σ. Since the
chain store’s profit function was derived under the assumption that s ≡ min{2(u −
pc), σ} = σ, it is necessary to verify whether the chain has an incentive to deviate,
adopting a high price such that s < σ. However, this cannot occur because when
deriving the prices, too many consumers were assumed to buy from the chain store
if the assumption s = σ does not hold. That is, we imposed a too favorable demand
facing the chain store. Consequently, if under this assumption the chain does not
choose a price sufficiently high to induce s∗ < σ, then it will a fortiori not choose
such a high price when demand is smaller.
Next, it needs to be verified whether the chain store has an incentive to deviate
from equilibrium to pc = pl∗ in order to attract all consumers, leaving the local
store with zero demand. If the chain store chooses price pl∗, it attracts Ql∗ addi-
tional customers in each city. The additional revenue thereby generated is pl∗Ql∗
per city. However, in each city the chain store loses the revenue (pc∗ − pl∗)(2−Ql∗)
on the customers it would have attracted even without the deviation. Deviation to
pl∗ is therefore profitable if only if
∆Π := Ql∗pl∗ −
(
2 − Ql∗
)
(pc∗ − pl∗) > 0.
Note that pc∗ − pl∗ = (2−α)
2
4 ≥ 1 for all α, 2 − Ql∗ = 12 Qc∗ and 12 Qc∗ > Ql∗.
Therefore,
∆Π = pl∗
[
Ql∗ − 1
2
Qc∗ (2 − α)
2
4
]
≤ pl∗
[
Ql∗ − 1
2
Qc∗
]
< 0.
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Hence, it is not profitable for the chain store to deviate to pl∗, or to any lower price.
Alternatively, a local store could deviate to a lower price in order to push the
chain store out of the market completely. Fix the chain store’s and the other local
store’s prices at pc∗ and pl∗ respectively. The local store in k could then set its price
so low as to make condition (4.3) hold. To this end it must choose price plk ≤ pD,
where pD is such that condition (4.3) holds with equality, i.e.,
(2 − α)(pc∗ − pD) = α(u − pc∗)
⇔
pD :=
2pc∗ − αu
2 − α
.
But
2pc∗ =
(2 − α)2 + 4
2(2 − α)2 + 4ασ < ασ < αu,
where the last inequality holds by assumption. Hence,
pD < 0
follows, proving that the deviation does not pay for a local store. This completes
the proof that the strategy profile stated in the proposition constitutes a SPE.
Uniqueness In deriving the above equilibrium prices, two crucial assumptions
on the prevailing demand structure were made: (i) all consumers shop, i.e., s∗ = σ
and (ii) that condition (4.3) does not hold.
(i) Suppose that s ≡ min{2(u − pc), σ} < σ. That is, the set of high switching
cost consumers who do not shop at all is non-empty. Notice that this does not affect
the local stores’ profit functions. Consequently, their first order conditions are still
given by (4.7). With s = 2(u − pc), the chain store’s profit function is
Πc(pc) =
(
2
2(u − pc)
σ
− Qlk
)
pc +
(
2
2(u − pc)
σ
− Ql−k
)
,
yielding the first order condition
0 = 4αu + 2pl−k + 2p
l
k − 8αp
c + αE pl−k − αp
l
k + αE p
l
k − αp
l
−k − 8p
c (4.12)
In addition, conditions (4.11) have to be satisfied. Candidate equilibrium prices are
given as solution to equations (4.7), (4.12) and (4.11). These prices are
p˜l :=
2αu
6 + α[(2 − α)2 + α]
p˜c :=
(2 − α)2 + 4
4
p˜l.
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These prices, however, imply
s = 2u − α(α
2 − 4α + 8)
α3 − 3α2 + 4α + 6
u > u > σ,
where the first inequality follows because the fraction is less than one for all α
and the second inequality holds by assumption. Thus, there is no equilibrium with
s < σ.
(ii) Suppose that condition (4.3) holds. That is, assume that the chain attracts
no customers in k. If the chain neither attracts consumers in −k, then lowering its
price is until it attracts some generates positive revenue. So, assume that the chain
attracts some consumers in −k. Then condition (4.3) must not hold in −k, implying
pl−k > p
l
k. (4.13)
The chain store’s demand is then given by some consumers in −k and by those
of them who move from −k to k. Total demand is thus
Qc(pc) = 2
σ
[
s − s−k
]
=
2
σ
[
s −
2 − α
α
(pc − pl
−k) − (pc − E plk)
]
.
For the case s = σ, the first order conditions from maximizing pcQc yields the
chain store’s reaction function
pc∗(pl
−k, E p
l
k) =
1
4
[
ασ + (2 − α)pl
−k + αE p
l
k
]
.
Now condition (4.3) for city k requires that 2pc > αu + (2 − α)plk. Using E plk = plk
and inserting pc∗(pl
−k, E p
l
k) for pc, condition (4.3) reads
1
4
[
ασ + (2 − α)pl−k + αplk
]
>
1
2
[
αu + (2 − α)pl−k
]
⇔
αplk > α(2u − σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>u
) + (2 − α)pl−k > αu
where the last inequality is due to u > σ. Condition (4.3) in k thus requires plk > u.
But this cannot be an equilibrium since the local store in k has no consumers in this
case.
For s = 2(u − pc) < σ, the chain store’s profit function is
Πc(pc) = 2
σ
[
2(u − pc) − 2 − α
α
(pc − pl−k) − (pc − E plk)
]
pc.
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Thus, its reaction function is
pc∗
(
pl−k, E p
l
k
)
=
1
4(1 + α)
[
2αu + (2 − α)pl−k + αE plk
]
.
Proceeding as before, one gets
1
4(1 + α)
[
2αu + (2 − α)pl−k + αE plk
]
>
1
2
[
αu + (2 − α)pl−k
]
⇒
1
4
[
2αu + (2 − α)pl−k + αE plk
]
>
1
2
[
αu + (2 − α)pl−k
]
⇔
αplk > (2 − α)pl−k
⇔
plk > p
l
−k
for condition (4.3). But this contradicts (4.13). There exists thus no equilibrium
with condition (4.3) holding. Hence, the equilibrium is unique. 
Discussion Market Shares and Profits. According to Proposition 1, the chain
store’s profits in each city (which are equal to half of the chain store’s total profit
Πc∗) are larger than the profits of a local store. Prices and profits of both local
stores and the chain store increase in α, but Πc∗ increases faster in α than Πl∗. Note
also that Qc∗(α) is strictly increasing in α. It equals 8/3 for α = 0 and is equal to
10/3 for α = 1. Because equilibrium demand aggregated over both periods and
both cities is four, the chain store’s market coverage increase from 2/3 to 5/6 as α
increases from zero to one.
Predicted Price Differences. The model predicts also that local stores charge
lower prices than chain stores. To see this, notice that
pc∗ =
(2 − α)2 + 4
4
pl∗ > pl∗
for all α. At first sight, this may seem at odds with empirical facts if one thinks of,
say, the retail industry.14 However, this indicates only that switching costs are not
the only driving factor in the retail industry, where increasing returns and market
power on the input side may be at least as important. On the other hand, there
are other industries where observed pricing patterns are hard to understand with-
out the factors that our model emphasizes. As mentioned at the very beginning, a
14See, e.g., Hausman and Leibtag (2004).
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local provider of bus trips from New York City to Boston is substantially cheaper
than the large chain. Similarly, the regional airline German Wings offers flights
that are cheaper by orders of magnitude than those of Lufthansa. Starbucks, the
largest coffee house chain, is not exactly known for providing cheap coffee, though
the price differences here are certainly less striking than those for bus trips or air-
fares. Casual empiricism in the hotel industry also suggests that large chains are
by no means cheaper than local hotels offering the same quality. More importantly,
though, there is also some systematic evidence that is in line with the price pattern
predicted by our model from the banking industry. Ishii (2004) estimates the effect
of ATM surcharges on retail banking industry structure and welfare.15 Surcharges
for withdrawing cash from banks other than the one at which a customer has his or
her deposit account impose a cost of switching banks to the consumer. Ishii finds
that consumers prefer banks with larger ATM networks, arguably because of lower
expected surcharge payments. She finds that banks with larger ATM networks pay
lower interest rates on deposits, which corresponds to charging a higher price in
our model.
Public Prices of Local Stores. The assumption that local stores’ prices are only
known locally has some consequences that are worth a brief discussion. Consider
the local store in k. Differentiating its best response function (4.8) with respect to
consumers’ expectations E plk yields
∂pl∗k (E plk)
∂E plk
= −
1
2
(
α
2 − α
)2
< 0.
That is, the lower the expected price, the higher the optimal price of the local store
in k. The reason for this is straightforward. A lower expected price implies a larger
demand, and the larger demand in turn induces the local store to set a higher price.
However, since in equilibrium consumers cannot be fooled, E plk = p
l
k must hold,
implying that a high price and low expected price are not consistent.
This behavior is reminiscent of the well known problem of the durable goods
seller uncovered by Coase (1972), in which consumers’ (correct) expectations of
lower future prices reduce demand in the presence, as a consequence of which
price in the presence is reduced as well. A durable goods seller who could commit
not to lower its price in the future would make a larger profit. Very similarly,
the local stores in our model could gain if they could credibly communicate their
15See also Knittel and Stango (2005).
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prices in both cities in period one, thereby committing themselves not to "cheat"
on consumers.16
Having said that, we should emphasize that the assumption that local stores’
prices are not completely public information is not only more realistic than assum-
ing that they are known in both cities, but it is also without consequences for the
qualitative predictions of our model. If we assumed instead that the prices of local
stores are known in both cities in period one, the chain store would still set a higher
price and make a larger profit than local stores.
4.6 Industry Equilibrium with Costly Entry
So far, we took market structures as given. In section 4.4, we analyzed the mar-
ket structure with local monopolies, and in the previous section we analyzed the
interplay of a chain store that competes with a local store in every city. An inter-
esting question is whether one of these configurations is stable in the sense that all
firms that are active make non-negative profits and that no additional firms have
incentives to enter the market.
As has already been seen, though local monopolies make positive profits, the
market structure with a local monopoly in each city is not stable because a chain
can profitably enter. So as to show that the market structure of section 4.5 is stable,
we thus have to show that no additional local store and no additional chain has an
incentive to enter if this market structure prevails.
Lemma 3. If there are two or more stores of the same type (local or chain) in a
city, at least two of them charge a price of zero, and all stores of the this type make
zero profits.
16Assuming that only the local store in k communicates its price in both cities, Eplk has to be
replaced by plk in the demand functions of the two local stores and of the chain. Everything else
remains the same. Equilibrium prices then are:
pˆlk =
1
2
σα
−12α + 5α2 + 8
48 − 104α + 93α2 − 40α3 + 8α4 ,
pˆl−k = ˆE p
l
−k = σα
4 − 6α + 3α2
48 − 104α + 93α2 − 40α3 + 8α4 ,
and
pˆc = σα
8 − 16α + 13α2 − 5α3 + α4
48 − 104α + 93α2 − 40α3 + 8α4 .
It can be checked that pˆlk > pl∗k holds and that equilibrium profit is larger when price is known in both
cities.
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Proof. Assume to the contrary that some firm makes positive profits. The only
way that this can happen is that it charges a positive price. But given that this firm
serves customers at a positive price, another firm of the same type will have an
incentive to slightly undercut this price and get all the customers from this firm.
Clearly, this race to the bottom will only stop if one of the firms charges a price
equal to zero. So that a firm that charges a price of zero has no incentive to raise its
price, it must be the case that another firm sets a price of zero as well. This proves
the claim about equilibrium prices. As to profits, note first that all firms that charge
a price of zero trivially make zero profits. Second, any firm that charges a higher
price will have no customers and consequently will make zero profits, too. 
Lemma 3 implies that the market structure with one local store in each city
and one chain serving both cities is the unique market structure if entry into the
industry is associated with some positive costs. Starting with no firms at all, either
a local or a chain store can profitably enter the market. If a local store enters, no
other local store will enter the same city, since profits would be zero. Another local
store will only enter in the other city. If there is a local store in each city, a chain
can still enter profitably but, due to Lemma 3, not more than one chain will enter.
Thus, we have:
Proposition 2. With small but positive entry costs, the unique stable market struc-
ture consists of a chain store with an outlet in both cities and a local store in each
city.
Regarding welfare, this market structure only achieves second best. Since
u > σ and since there are no production costs, it is optimal that all consumers
consume the good in both periods. As Proposition 1 showed, all consumers shop
in equilibrium in both periods. However, some of them shop at local stores and are
thus confronted with expected switching costs of (1 + α)s.
With two competing chains, prices are zero and all consumers shop in both pe-
riods. But now expected switching costs are only s for all consumers. Therefore,
first best would be achieved by two competing chains. But as just argued, this is not
a stable market structure. The only stable market structure with one chain and a lo-
cal shop in each city, thus generates higher welfare than do two local monopolists,
but does not attain first best welfare.
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4.7 Conclusions
We study a two city model where mobile consumers face costs of switching sellers.
Since consumers change the city with an exogenous probability, they can reduce
expected switching costs by shopping at a chain store rather than at a local store.
If consumers differ with respect to switching costs, firm size serves as a means of
product differentiation, where local stores serve low switching cost consumers and
chain stores serve high switching cost consumers.
This model provides three key insights. First, the market structure with a local
store and a chain store in each city is the unique stable market structure if there is
a small, positive cost of entry. That is, local stores coexist in equilibrium with the
chain store. Second, the chain store charges a higher price than local stores. Third,
as consumers become more mobile, the market share of the chain store increases,
and so do profits and prices of all stores. Moreover, the chain store becomes more
profitable relative to local stores as mobility increases.
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Chapter 5
Can Conglomerates Ease Credit
Constraints?
5.1 Introduction
In contrast to the Modigliani-Miller-Theorem, it is widely acknowledged in the
literature that a firm’s financial structure is relevant for its profitability. Departing
from a world of perfect contracts where all information is verifiable, the corporate
finance literature studies the incentive effects of a firm’s financial structure. 1
Financing constraints arising from asymmetric or non-verifiable information
also shed light on the issue of defining the boundaries of the firm. Does owner-
provided investment strengthen or undermine managers’ incentives to act in the
interest of the investor? As was pointed out by Zingales (2000), a satisfactory an-
swer to this question must be motivated by the costs and benefits of allocating funds
through a firm relative to having arms-length market transactions. A theory of the
firm is inevitably necessary for analyzing the financing decision in general and the
relative efficiency of internal or external financing in particular. The internal capi-
tal market hypothesis states that “internal markets of diversified firms enable them
to fund profitable projects that, because of information asymmetries and agency
costs, the external capital market would not be able to finance.”(Shin and Stulz,
1998, p.531).
This tradeoff between internal and external finance has received considerable
attention during the last decade (Stein (1997), Gertner et al. (1994), Inderst and Müller
(2003), Brusco and Panunzi (2005)). Still, most of these papers do not fully ad-
dress an important issue. They assume that headquarters have some superior ca-
1A recent survey is given by Hart (2001). See also Harris and Raviv (1991).
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pabilities compared to an external investor in dealing with agency problems. Due
to the incompleteness of contracts, external investors cannot reap the full value of
cash flows produced by the firm, which are (at least in part) not verifiable. How-
ever, headquarters somehow manage to get their hands on these nonverifiable cash
flows.
For example, in Stein (1997)’s winner picking model, headquarters can im-
prove a conglomerate’s financing possibilities by reallocating funds between projects
of different profitability. Headquarters are assumed to be able to monitor the
projects it oversees and it is endowed with authority to reallocate resources. This
authority also allows headquarters to appropriate a fraction of its project manager’s
private benefits. The model I present below aims at explaining where this power
to appropriate private benefits comes from. It is argued that headquarters informa-
tional advantage comes with a contractual advantage. Although formal contracting
possibilities are the same for outside investors and headquarters, the latter can re-
sort to informal contracts.
Similarly, Inderst and Müller (2003) compare centralized (via headquarters) to
decentralized borrowing (each project is directly financed by outside funds) under
the premise that cash flows are not verifiable. Conglomerates can improve upon
stand alone projects through cash flow pooling: Excess cash flow from one project
can be used to buy continuation of another, liquidity constrained, project. How-
ever, in analyzing centralized financing they implicitly assume that cash flows are
verifiable to headquarters since headquarters do not face any difficulties in appro-
priating their project managers cash flows (as opposed to outside investors). The
model presented below explains that this “increased verifiability” of cash flows for
headquarters may stem from its possibility to use an informal employment contract
with its project managers.
This article provides a rationale for how headquarters can mitigate a conglom-
erate’s internal agency problem. Due to their informational advantage, headquar-
ters can use informal contracts which are not available to the outside investor (e.g.
a bank). Whether this advantage translates into increased investor’s expected return
depends on the characteristics of the conglomerate’s projects. The model derives
conditions under which conglomerates are able to finance projects that would not
be viable if financed independently on external capital markets. The model com-
pares two cases. Case 1 (“independent financing”) is where two identical projects
are financed independently using a formal financial contract between entrepreneurs
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Entrepreneur 1
financial
Entrepreneur
(HQ)
Entrepreneur
(PM)
employment
financial
Investor
Entrepreneur 2
Independent financing Conglomerate financing
Investor
Figure 5.1: Independent project financing vs. conglomerate financing.
and investor. Case 2 (“conglomerate financing”) is where two entrepreneurs use an
informal contract between themselves and a formal financial contract with the in-
vestor (see Figure 5.1).
Empirical studies find that conglomerates trade at a discount compared to an
equivalent portfolio of stand-alone firms. Berger and Ofek (1995) estimate a dis-
count of up to 15 percent.2 Lang and Stulz (1994) document a significant diversi-
fication discount throughout the 1980s as well.
Graham et al. (2002) criticize these studies for neglecting potential selection
problems. There might be systematic differences between divisions of conglomer-
ates and stand-alone firms that serve as the benchmark. Indeed, Hubbard and Palia
(1999) find evidence suggesting that the highest bidder returns in conglomerate
mergers during the 1960s were realized by financially unconstrained buyers acquir-
ing financially constrained target firms. This tends to confirm the internal capital
market view of conglomerates. Moreover, Fluck and Lynch (1999) note that if con-
glomerates enable the financing of marginally profitable projects which otherwise
would not be viable, conglomerates will as a consequence be less profitable than
stand-alone firms, causing them to be traded at a discount.
The model presented below supports this hypothesis. Projects which are fi-
nanced optimally through a conglomerate are predicted to deliver smaller expected
2They analyze a sample of roughly 3,500 firms contained in the Compustat industry segment
database which covers US and Canadian firms.
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Figure 5.2: Timing.
returns to the investor than projects which are optimally financed as independent
entities.
Section 5.2 presents the basic model characterizing the relationship between
an entrepreneur and an outside investor (i.e. the case of independent financing).
Section 5.3 takes this model as a building block in order to analyze conglomer-
ate financing. After deriving optimality conditions, results are compared to those
pertaining to independent financing. Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 Basic Model
The model is based on Aghion and Bolton (1992). A risk-neutral entrepreneur
owns a project which produces cash flows at two dates, being either 1 (successful)
or 0 (unsuccessful). Since the entrepreneur himself has no wealth, he requires
funds from a risk–neutral investor to finance the project.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the timing. After initial investment I is sunk at t = 0, the
project can either turn out to be in a good (θg) or in a bad state (θb). The ex ante
probability of the good state is p. After the state of the project realized, a choice
of action a1 is required. There are three option available: “continue” (C), “reor-
ganize” (R) or “liquidate” (L). The impact of this action on expected cash flows
depends on the state of the project. In the good state no special action is required
(C is optimal), and the project can be continued as before. In this case it delivers
high cash flow with probability πg ≡ E[yt |θ = θg,C]. However, if the project is
in the bad state, reorganizing the project increases the probability of success com-
pared to continuing as before (R is optimal). By choosing to reorganize, the project
is successful with probability πR ≡ E[yt |θ = θb,R] and by choosing to continue,
the project is successful with probability πb ≡ E[yt |θ = θb,C] < πR. Liquidation,
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t = 1 action (a1) → actions available at t = 2 (a2)
continue (C) → continue (C), reorganize (R), liquidate (L)
reorganize (R) → continue reorganization (R), liquidate (L)
liquidate (L) → none
Table 5.1: Summary of available actions for t = 1 and t = 2.
finally, refers to either putting the project’s assets to its most valuable alternative
use or replacing the entrepreneur. The expected cash flow from liquidating is in-
dependent of the state of the project and is assumed to be worse than reorganizing.
Therefore, liquidation might only be valuable as a strategic threat. For future ref-
erence, the expected per period cash flows E[y|θ, a] for all different combinations
of project state (θ) and action chosen (a) are summarized below.
E[y|θ, a] =
Project action
state a = C a = R a = L
θ = θg πg πb π0
θ = θb πb πR π0
After first period cash flow (y1) realized, a second action choice (a2) leading
to a second cash flow realization (y2) is required. In principle, the set of available
options is the same as in the first period: a2 ∈ {C,R, L}. However, if liquidation was
chosen before (a1 = L) then the project is terminated at the end of period 1 and, as
a consequence, no action choice is required in period two. Similarly, if reorgani-
zation was chosen in period one already (a1 = R), it is not possible to reverse it in
period two. In this case options are limited to either continue reorganizing (a2 = R)
or to liquidate the project (a2 = L). Finally, if continuation was chosen in period
one (a1 = C), all three options are available in period two (a2 ∈ {C,R, L}). Table
5.1 summarizes available actions at t = 1 and t = 2. The project terminates after
second period cash flow was realized.
Besides allowing for two consecutive phases of action choice and cash flow re-
alization instead of one, the model presented here differs from Aghion and Bolton
(1992) in two important ways. First, there is no verifiable signal on the projects
profitability except for realized cash flow. Second, the signal in Aghion and Bolton
is observed before action choice and does therefore contain no information on
which action was chosen. Here, however, first period cash flow which also serves
as a signal on the project’s state is observed after action chosen and thus contains
information about the choice of action.
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Expected returns are structured as follows (recall that expected returns are 1 or
0):
πg ≥ πR >
1
2
> πb. (5.1)
The investor who provides investment I only cares about his share in total mon-
etary returns yt(θ, a). The entrepreneur who came up with the project-proposal and
is running it not only cares about his share in monetary returns but also about pri-
vate benefits B(at). These private benefits depend on the action chosen but not on
the state of the project. It is assumed that B(C) ≡ B and B(R) = B(L) = 0. The
entrepreneur thus derives private benefits B from continuing the project regardless
of the state θ.
Although the entrepreneur forgoes private benefits by reorganizing a bad project,
the additional cash flows realized by reorganizing more than compensate this loss:
πR > πb + B. (5.2)
If the entrepreneur is the full claimant on cash flows, he therefore prefers to reorga-
nize b ad projects. However, if his share of cash flow is sufficiently los, he prefers
to continue bad projects and thereby to collect his private benefits.
Private Benefits from Continuation. There are several plausible reasons for the
existence of private benefits as postulated here. For example, an entrepreneur in-
teracting with his employees on a daily basis does not like to confront them with
unpleasant decisions like lay offs or restructuring. Moreover, an entrepreneur might
adopt his employees’ (or other stake holders’) preferences, generating a preference
for continuation (see Hart and Holmstrom, 2002). An outside party, like banks
or consultants, is not locked into this ’corporate culture’ and shy away from un-
pleasant decisions. As a consequence, it does not enjoy any private benefits from
continuation.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) empirically estimate the effect of relaxation
of corporate governance as measured by the introduction of anti-takeover laws on
managerial behavior. They conclude that behavior resembles preferences for a
quiet live. After anti–takeover laws were passed, less plants were closed down but
new plants were also less likely to be built. Also do employees’ wages increase
after the introduction of such laws. This evidence supports the notion of private
benefits from continuation (and contradicts the notion of empire building, which
presumes that managers prefer to actively build new plants or divisions).
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Private benefits from project continuation create a potential conflict of inter-
est between entrepreneur and outside investor. If the entrepreneur had sufficient
wealth to fund his project out of his own pocket, no problem would arise because
in this case he is the full claimant of cash flows. If, however, he has to approach an
investor for funds, the conflict of interest provoked by the presence of private bene-
fits generates an agency problem. In order to induce the entrepreneur to reorganize
bad projects, the investor must grant him some minimal share of the project’s cash
flow, reducing the investor’s expected return. This reduction might be sufficient to
make it unprofitable for the investor to finance the project. Before analyzing this
agency problem in detail, the first best contract is derived as a benchmark.
5.2.1 First Best and Laissez-faire Contracts
The first best contract is associated with the optimal contract chosen, if it is possible
to include all available and relevant variables in a verifiable contract.3 Such a
contract needs to specify which actions are to be implemented in which state of the
project. A contract s is thus given by s = {a(θ), t}, where t refers to a monetary
transfer from the investor to the entrepreneur. The optimal contract s∗ maximizes
total expected surplus
E
[
y1(θ, a1) + B(a1) + y2(θ, a2) + B(a2)] . (5.3)
Due to (5.2), this expression is maximized for a∗1(θg) = a∗2(θg) = C and a∗1(θb) =
a∗2(θb) = R.
Clearly, the contract implemented depends on the bargaining power of the in-
vestor and the entrepreneur. If the investor can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
the entrepreneur, no transfer will be included in the contract, i.e t = 0. If, on the
other hand, the entrepreneur can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the investor, the
contract would specify the largest possible transfer to the entrepreneur that still
guarantees an expected return of I to the investor, i.e. t = E(y1|s∗) + E(y2|s∗) − I =
2E(y|s∗) − I. Because cash flows are identically and independently distributed in
both periods, expected cash flows are the same in both periods, that is E(y|s∗) =
pπg + (1 − p)πR. To simplify exposition, the remainder of the paper assumes that
all bargaining power is vested with the investor.
3First best can also be associated with the counterfactual case where the entrepreneur has unlim-
ited own funds and does not need to contract with an external investor at all.
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Assumption 1. The investor has all bargaining power, i.e. she is always in the
position to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the entrepreneur.
With Assumption 1, the first best contract has t∗ = 0, that is no transfers at all to
the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur thus receives expected private benefits 2pB but
no share in cash flows. Investor’s expected return net of investment is 2E(y|s∗)− I.
All projects with a positive net present value (NPV) are thus carried out and no
profitable project is credit constrained.
Note that from the perspective of efficiency, all positive NPV projects should be
financed. Whether this is achieved with or without any monetary transfers between
entrepreneur and investor is irrelevant. Given that the project is implemented and
run until t = 2, any transfer between entrepreneur and investor has only distribu-
tional consequences and does not affect efficiency.
Since state (θ), actions (at) and private benefits (B) are not verifiable, moral
hazard issues arise in the contracting relationship. The standard solution would be
to devise an incentive contract specifying transfers from and to the investor con-
ditional on output (cash flow). In the present context of risk neutral players, such
an incentive contract would guarantee that all positive NPV projects are imple-
mented. However, such a contract generally is not compatible with limited liability
on the part of the entrepreneur. Since a central aspect of the present paper is to dis-
cuss financing possibilities for wealth-constrained entrepreneurs, limited liability
is naturally given here. Entrepreneurs’ wealth (or utility) is bounded from below
by zero. Although all players are risk neutral, limited liability imposes costs for
project financing and makes it impossible to fund all positive NPV projects.
As an alternative to an incentive contract, the investor could let the entrepreneur
choose his preferred action. The investor could simply provide initial investment
and then claim all future cash flows. In this case the entrepreneur will never reor-
ganize bad projects, resulting in an expected return of 2
[
pπg + (1 − p)πb
]
for the
investor. In order for the financing problem to be interesting at all, it is assumed
that the expected return from such a “laissez-faire”-contract is smaller than invest-
ment costs I, yielding a negative NPV for the project. A “laissez-faire”-contract
will therefore never be chosen by the investor.
Before discussing the optimal contract (Section 5.2.3), the informational envi-
ronment in which investor and entrepreneur interact needs to be clarified.
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5.2.2 Entrepreneur’s Role and Informational Assumptions
Given the model outlined so far, the most obvious solution for a financially con-
strained entrepreneur is to sell his project to a financially unconstrained investor. If
the investor is as good as the entrepreneur in running the project, all agency prob-
lems are resolved by this transaction. An investor is willing to pay a maximum of
2E(y) − I, that is the full expected net present value of the project.4
If all actions taken by the entrepreneur can as well be taken by the investor, the
entrepreneur is not necessary for running his project. The value of the entrepreneur
is in this case reduced to the value of his business idea. Once the idea is sold
to the investor, the latter can run the project herself. This is not very plausible
and even if it were, it constitutes a case of minor interest. The issue of project
financing becomes important if the entrepreneur’s human capital is inalienable to
some degree, causing the investor to depend on the entrepreneur.
Assumption 2. The entrepreneur is necessary for running his project. Without
the entrepreneur, the investor’s only option is to liquidate the project. Liquidating
yields an expected cash flow of π0, where πR > π0 ≥ πb and 2π0 < I.
So far it was implicitly assumed that investor and entrepreneur share the same
information (both observe θ). Intuitively, one would suppose that only the entrepre-
neur knows exactly what is going on in his market or industry and that an outside
investor has much less detailed knowledge of the entrepreneur’s industry.5 De-
tailed knowledge requires playing an active role in the market and communicating
with employees, customers and suppliers while constantly analyzing competitors’
behavior and decisions. This knowledge cannot be acquired by monitoring an in-
dustry, like some specialized consulting firm would do, or by inspecting the firm’s
books. Clearly, specialized consulting firms are able to learn more about an indus-
try than an outside investor like a bank, but there is still some valuable knowledge
which can only be acquired by actively participating in this industry.
For the remainder of the paper it is assumed that an outside investor has less
information than does an entrepreneur who is actively involved in his industry.
This is in line with Shin and Stulz (1998, p.531), who emphasize the importance
of asymmetric information in explaining the potential advantage of internal capital
4This option is also feasible in Aghion and Bolton (1992) although it is not discussed there. A
Pareto-efficient allocation is always achievable by selling the project to the investor.
5See also Stein (1997, p.117).
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markets. Moreover, actions, state of the project and private benefits are assumed to
be non-verifiable.
Assumption 3. Cash flows yt, are verifiable but actions at, project state θ and
private benefits B, are not. In addition, state θ is only observed by the entrepreneur
but not by an outside investor.
The presence of private benefits from continuing the project might actually be
related to having superior knowledge. If superior knowledge is only obtainable
through investment in project- or firm-specific human capital, individuals having
access to such knowledge would naturally derive private benefits from it. These
benefits would however be lost in the event of reorganization, which would cause
the entrepreneur to lose his project-specific human capital.
5.2.3 Optimal Contract
A financial contract between entrepreneur and investor specifies cash flow shares
wt(yt), depending on cash flow realizations yt. In addition, control over the project,
that is the right to choose actions a1 and a2, could be allocated to one of the two
contracting parties. Due to Assumption 3, control over action a1 has to be allocated
unconditionally to the entrepreneur. Remember that the first verifiable information
y1 is observed after the choice of action a1 only. If the investor had control over the
project, she could only choose to liquidate the project at t = 1 (continuation and
reorganization are only available to the entrepreneur). This is not in her interest
because this guarantees a negative NPV for the project. However, action a2 can
be allocated conditionally on realized first-period cash flow y1. Denote by β ∈
[0, 1] the probability that control is allocated to the entrepreneur at t = 1. The
most general contract is thus given by s = (w1, β(y1),w2(y1)), with control initially
allocated to the entrepreneur. After first-period cash flow was realized at t = 1,
revenues are shared according to 1 ≥ w1 ≥ 0. Hence, control is allocated to the
entrepreneur with probability β(y1), and revenues at t = 2 are shared according to
w2(y1).
Allocating control to the investor at t = 1 contingent on first-period cash flow
(y1) serves to increase the entrepreneur’s incentive to reorganize. Zero first-period
cash flow increases the investor’s belief that the project is in the bad state θb and
that the entrepreneur did not reorganize the bad project (a1 , R). In order to induce
the entrepreneur to reorganize bad projects and thereby increase the probability of
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positive first-period cash flow, the investor could threaten to liquidate the project
given that first-period cash flow is zero. If the project is liquidated, the entrepreneur
does not receive any cash flow at t = 2 and he loses private benefits B in case he
would choose to continue. The investor, on the other hand, would secure herself an
expected return of π0. However, the following lemma shows that such a liquidation
threat by the investor is not credible.
Lemma 4. It is in the investor’s interest to allocate control unconditionally to the
entrepreneur: β(y1) = 1 for all y1.
Proof. First note that this paper focusses on pure strategies. The entrepreneur will
therefore either choose to reorganize a bad project or to continue a bad project. He
is not allowed to mix.
Further note that because E(y2|y1 = 0, θ = θb,R) > π0, the investor will only
use liquidation as a threat in order to induce the entrepreneur to reorganize. Now,
suppose that the entrepreneur beliefs that the investor will liquidate a project re-
turning zero cash flow. Suppose further that this threat is effective, that is the en-
trepreneur will indeed prefer to reorganize bad projects to continuing them. But in
this case, the investor “knows” that the entrepreneur will reorganize bad projects.
Even if zero cash flow realizes, the investor knows that the entrepreneur would
have chosen to reorganize if the project was bad. The investor has no (ex post)
incentive to actually liquidate the project because this guarantees lower expected
return than continuing. Liquidating is thus not sequentially rational.

Given that in equilibrium such a threat effectively deters the entrepreneur from
continuing a bad project, the investor will not liquidate the project even if first-
period cash flow was zero because E(y2|y1 = 0, θ = θb,R) > πR > π0. Liquidating
the project is thus not sequentially rational.
Incentives similarly to these induced by a liquidation-threat can be provided by
choosing the entrepreneur’s second-period share of cash flow, w2(y1), to be zero in
case first-period cash flow was zero. The entrepreneur does not receive any second-
period cash flow if first-period cash flow was zero (as with liquidation) but he is
able to retain his private benefits should he choose to continue a bad project. As
Proposition 3 below shows, this is the investor’s preferred contract for a large and
plausible range of model parameters.
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Note that because action choices are assumed to be non-verifiable ex ante and
ex post, message games are not feasible even with symmetric information between
investor and entrepreneur.6
Expected first-period cash flow is E(y1). Expected second-period cash flow
is E(y2) = E(y1). The investor can distinguish two conditional expectations for
second-period cash flow.7The first is expected second-period cash flow given that
first-period cash flow was equal to one (which occurs with probability Pr(y1 = 1) ≡
E(y1)). The second is expected second-period cash flow given that first-period cash
flow was equal to zero (which occurs with probability Pr(y1 = 0) ≡ 1 − E(y1)). In
the former case expected second-period cash flow is E[y2|y1 = 1], and in the latter
case it is E[y2|y1 = 0]. One therefore has
Pr(y1 = 1)E[y2 |y1 = 1] = pπ2g + (1 − p)π2R (5.4)
Pr(y1 = 0)E[y2 |y1 = 0] = p(1 − πg)πg + (1 − p)(1 − πR)πR. (5.5)
Investor’s expected return V(·) is then given by
V(w1,w2(1),w2(0)) := [1 − w1]E(y1) + [1 − w2(0)]Pr(y1 = 0)E(y2 |y1 = 0)
+ [1 − w2(1)]Pr(y1 = 1)E(y2 |y1 = 1). (5.6)
The entrepreneur’s incentive constraint must guarantee that the he will reor-
ganize bad projects. If the project is in the good state (θg), no incentive issues
arise since continuation is preferred by entrepreneur and investor. If, however, the
project is in the bad state (θb), the project will produce a positive cash flow (y1 = 1)
with probability πR if the project is reorganized but only with probability πb if con-
tinued.
First-period cash flow provides valuable information for the investor who does
not observe θ by permitting her to update her prior belief concerning the probability
6If actions were verifiable ex post and entrepreneur and investor shared the same information,
the following message game could be envisaged. After observing the state of nature, both players
announce the state of nature to a third party. If the announced states coincide, prespecified action a(ˆθ)
with a(ˆθg) = C and a(ˆθb) = R is implemented and transfer t(ˆθ) is made from investor to entrepreneur,
with t(θg) = z > 0 and t(θb) = 2B + z, and z slightly larger than 2πb. If the announced states do
not coincide, the project is liquidated and the proceeds from liquidation are allocated to the third
party. Abstracting from renegotiation and enforceability concerns, investor’s expected return from
this contract is 2E(y) − (1 − p)2B − 2πb. Depending on the size of πb, this return might be too small
for the investor to recover her investment costs I. In this case, the project cannot be financed using
message contracts. However, if actions are not verifiable ex post, message games are not feasible.
7Note that E(y2) = Pr(y1 = 0)E[y2 |y1 = 0] + Pr(y1 = 1)E[y2 |y1 = 1] = [1 − E(y1)]E[y2 |y1 =
0] + E(y1)E[y2 |y1 = 1].
102
Can Conglomerates Ease Credit Constraints?
that the project is in the good state. On the other hand, first-period cash flow
does not provide any additional information to the entrepreneur because he directly
observes the project’s state and thus has full information. Therefore, even if first-
period cash flow was positive in the bad state (which occurs with probability πR or
πb, depending on the action a1 chosen), expected second-period cash flow is still
πR or πb. The entrepreneur will thus reorganize the project if
w1πR + w2(1)πRπR + w2(0)(1 − πR)πR
≥ w1πb + w2(1)πbπb + w2(0)(1 − πb)πb + 2B (5.7)
Rewriting the objective function V defined in (5.6) and incentive constraint IC
given in (5.7), the investor’s problem is given by8
max
w1,w2(0),w2(1)
(5.8)
2E(y) − w1E(y) − w2(0)E(y)E[y2 |y1 = 0] − w2(1)E(y)E[y1 |y2 = 1]
subject to
w1 + w2(1)(πR + πb) + w2(0)(1 − πR − πb) ≥ 2B/(πR − πb). (5.9)
Objective function as well as incentive constraint are linear in entrepreneurs’
shares of cash flow wt(h). Whether incentives are most effectively provided through
w1, w2(1) or w2(0) depends on the coefficients γ(w) := −ICw/Vw where ICw is the
partial derivative of the incentive constraint with respect to w and Vw the partial
derivative of the objective function with respect to the same w. γ(w) expresses the
efficiency of providing incentives through share w. The larger the effect of w on
incentives (ICw) and the smaller the associated loss in investor’s expected return
(Vw), the higher is the efficiency coefficient γ(w). Incentives are thus preferably
provided through the share w with the highest γ(w).
A simple equity contract would have the same share of cash flow w in both
periods, regardless of the level of first-period cash flow. Proposition 3 below shows
that such a standard equity contract will generally not be optimal. The optimal
contract includes second-period shares that are contingent on cash flows.
Proposition 3. An uninformed investor financing a single project will optimally
choose the following contract.
8Because E(y1)E[y2 |y1 = 1] + [1 − E(y1)]E[y2 |y1 = 0] = E(y1) and E(y) ≡ E(y1) = E(y2), the
objective function can be written 2E(y) − w1E(y) − w21E(y)E[y1 |y2 = 1] − w20E(y)E[y2 |y1 = 0].
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(i) If πR + πb > E(y2|y1 = 1) then
w2(1)∗ = 2B
π2R − π
2
b
and w∗1 = w
∗
2(0) = 0.
(ii) If πR + πb < E(y2|y1 = 1) then
w2(0)∗ = 2B
πR − πb
and w∗1 = w
∗
2(1) = 0.
(iii) If πR + πb = E(y2|y1 = 1) then
w∗1 = w
∗
2(0) = w∗2(1) =
B
πR − πb
(Simple equity contract).
Proof. The proof has three steps. It shows (i) that from πR + πb > E(y2|y = 1)
it follows that γ(w2(1)) > γ(w1) > γ(w2(0)) and incentives are thus best provided
by w2(1). Next it is shown that (ii) from πR + πb < E(y2|y = 1) it follows that
γ(w2(1)) < γ(w1) < γ(w2(0)) and incentives are thus best provided by w2(0). Fi-
nally, with (iii) πR+πb = E(y2|y = 1) all γ’s are identical in which case the investor
is indifferent between the three available cash flow shares.
(i) Note that if πR + πb > 1, γ(w2(0)) < 0 and γ(w2(1)) > γ(w1). Incentives are
thus best provided through w2(1). Remains the case where πR + πb ≤ 1.
With 1 ≥ πR + πb > E(y2|y1 = 1) > E(y), it follows that
1 − πR − πb
[1 − E(y)]E(y2 |y1 = 0) <
1 − E(y2|y1 = 1)
[1 − E(y)]E(y2 |y1 = 0) . (5.10)
Since E(y2) = E(y)E(y2 |y1 = 1) + [1 − E(y)]E(y2 |y1 = 0) and E(y2) = E(y) it
follows that
1 − E(y2|y1 = 1)
[1 − E(y)]E(y2 |y1 = 0) =
1
E(y) . (5.11)
Furthermore, because of πR + πb > E(y2|y1 = 1), we have
1
E(y) <
1
E(y)
πR + πb
E(y2|y1 = 1) . (5.12)
Combining (5.10), (5.11) and (5.12) yields
πR + πb
E(y)E(y2 |y1 = 1) >
1
E(y2) >
1 − πR − πb
[1 − E(y)]E(y2 |y1 = 0) (5.13)
which is equal to γ(w2(1)) > γ(w1) > γ(w2(0)), implying that incentives are more
effectively provided through w2(1). Setting w1 = w2(0) = 0 in the incentive con-
straint (5.9) and solving for w2(1) yields w2(1)∗ = 2B/(π2R − π2b).
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(ii) With πR + πb < E(y2|y1 = 1) the inequalities in (5.10) and (5.12) are
inverted, leading to γ(w2(1)) < γ(w1) < γ(w2(0)). In this case, incentives are best
provided by w2(0). Setting w1 = w2(1) = 0 in the incentive constraint (5.9) and
solving for w2(0) yields w2(0)∗ = 2B/(πR − πb).
(iii) Clearly, with πR + πb = E(y2|y1 = 1) the inequalities in (5.10) and (5.12)
turn into equalities. Since in this case the investor is indifferent between the avail-
able cash flow shares, one particular solution is to use all three shares equally.
Setting w ≡ w1 = w2(0) = w2(1) and solving (5.9) for w yields w = B/(πR − πb).
Substituting optimal shares into the objective function of (5.8), investor’s max-
imum expected return becomes
V∗ = E(y1) + E(y2) − 2b
π2R − π
2
b
E(y2)E(y1|y2 = 1)
= 2
1 − BE[y2|y1 = 1](π2R − π2b)
 E(y2). (5.14)

Proposition 3 shows under which conditions which shares w1 and w2(y1) are
most effective in providing incentives to the entrepreneur. If the share w2(1) is used
then the entrepreneur’s gain in expected cash flow from reorganizing bad projects
is π2R − π
2
b = (πR + πb)(πR − πb). Investor’s “marginal costs” of using w2(1) is
E(y2|y1 = 1), resulting in per unit costs of providing additional incentives to the
entrepreneur of π
2
R−π
2
b
E(y2 |y1=1) . The respective costs of providing additional incentives
to the entrepreneur by using the share w1 are πR−πbE(y1) . Condition (i) of Proposition
3 states that if the latter cost is lower than the former then the share w2(1) is to be
used. The remaining two conditions in the proposition state under which conditions
the other two shares are optimal.
Empirical studies for the venture capital (VC) industry find financial arrange-
ments that are similar to the optimal contract in Proposition 3. For instance Kaplan and Strömberg
(2003, 2001), argue that cash flow rights are often conditional on observable mea-
sures of financial performance. This corresponds with the optimal contract derived
above, where claims to second-period cash flow are only granted to the entrepre-
neur if first-period cash flow was high.
Empirical findings also suggest that control over the project shifts conditional
on observable performance measures. The optimal contract in the present model,
however, does not allow for contingent control allocation because of a (strong)
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informational assumption of the model. The investor or venture capitalist lacks the
necessary information from deriving a benefit from controlling the project. This
contrasts with findings by Sahlman (1990), where venture capitalists are reported
to take an active part in operational decisions and do in fact have control rights.
Although the model presented here captures one prominent feature of ven-
ture capital finance (namely the contingent allocation of cash flow rights), a richer
model which relaxes the informational assumption is necessary to allow for con-
tingent allocation of control to be a valuable governance instrument. As argued
above, assuming symmetric information would not be satisfactory, since in this
special case the entrepreneur’s value is reduced to the value of his project idea. A
promising extension would be to allow external investors to possess information
that is complementary to that of the entrepreneur.
5.3 Conglomerate Financing
This section analyzes the possibility of two entrepreneurs financing their projects
jointly within a conglomerate. The external investor finances the conglomerate.
This implies joint finance of projects and joint observation of cash flows. Cash
flows of individual projects are no longer verifiable to the outside investor.
Assumption 4. For two projects pursued within a conglomerate, only (joint) con-
glomerate cash flow is verifiable. The cash flows of individual projects are no
longer verifiable.
Nonverifiability of individual cash flows inside a conglomerate can be moti-
vated by the fact that headquarters are able transfer cash flows from one project to
the other without leaving a verifiable trace. Accounts only state conglomerate cash
flow rather than project-specific cash flows.
Since according to Assumption 4 an investor can only contract on the conglom-
erate’s joint cash flow, the entrepreneurs’ incentives to reorganize bad projects are
reduced. Each entrepreneur will partially free ride on the other’s success. It is
evident that incentives are more focussed if the investor finances each project sepa-
rately. Therefore, pooling cash flows per se makes conglomerate financing inferior
to independent project financing. This contrasts the result from Inderst and Müller
(2003), where conglomerate’s advantage is explained precisely with the pooling
of cash flows. In their model it is assumed that cash flows are not verifiable at
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all. In order to provide entrepreneurs with an incentive to repay their loans, in-
vestors threaten not to finance continuation of projects in case entrepreneurs de-
fault. Investors therefore inefficiently liquidate the project with positive probability.
Cash flow pooling reduces this probability since headquarters can use a success-
ful project’s cash flow to secure the continuation of an unsuccessful project. In
the present paper, however, joint cash flow is verifiable, and the only restriction
for the investor is to provide entrepreneurs with sufficient incentives to reorganize
bad projects. Because cash flow realizations depend on entrepreneurs’ actions,
incentives are provided via cash flow shares. Since projects are assumed to be in-
dependent9 of each other, cash flow pooling leads to a loss of information with
regard to the behavior of each entrepreneur. It is no longer possible for an investor
to distinguish each project’s cash flow within total cash flow.
The advantage of a conglomerate must therefore stem from another source.
This paper claims that the advantage of a conglomerate is the result of making use
of informal contracts between the two entrepreneurs. Due to Assumption 3, they
both observe each other’s state of the project θ. While this information as well as
choice of action is not verifiable, they are free to codify it in an informal contract.
For the sake of clarity, such a contract will be called an “employment contract” in
contrast to the formal contract between investor and entrepreneur, which will be
called a “financial contract”.10
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, two entrepreneurs, called headquarters (HQ) and
project manager (PM), form a conglomerate to jointly finance their projects. HQ
and investor use a formal contract to secure investment funds for both projects
while HQ and PM use an informal contract to guarantee the desired behavior on
part of the PM.
Before analyzing this informal employment contract in detail, the structure of
the investor’s problem when financing a conglomerate is studied.
9The states of the projects are assumed to be uncorrelated although they are in the same industry.
This is somewhat counterintuitive, but simplifies the analysis considerably. See also the discussion
in Stein (1997, B.1 and B.2).
10The terms “employment” and “financial” serve only to distinguish the two contracts. Both con-
tracts are incentive contracts and there is no reason why a priori one should be viewed as an em-
ployment contract while the other as a financial contract. As Dybvig and Zender (1991) show, the
incentives provided by a financial contract can equally well be provided by an employment/incentive
contract, making the distinction between these two contracts artificial.
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5.3.1 Structure of the Investor’s Problem
In order to study the contracting problem between investor and HQ in isolation,
it is assumed for the moment that the PM will always reorganize bad projects.
The contract between HQ and PM and its implication for the outside investor is
discussed in section 5.3.2 below.
Conglomerate cash flow at the end of period t is denoted by Yt = y1t + y2t , where
yit ∈ {0, 1} denotes cash flow of project i at date t. Note that compared to financing
each project independently, contracting possibilities are richer now for the investor,
since conglomerate cash flow can attain three levels, Yt ∈ {0, 1, 2}. As with single
project financing, the contract specifies HQ’s shares of cash flow w1 and w2. As
before, these shares can be specified contingent on previous and current cash flow
levels: w1(Y1) and w2(Y1, Y2). Let Pr(Y1 = h) denote the probability that first-
period cash flow is equal to h and let Pr(Y2 = h′|Y1 = h) denote the conditional
probability that second-period cash flow is equal to h′ given that first-period cash
flow was equal to h. The investor’s objective function now is11
max
w1(h),w2(h,h′)
2∑
h=1
[1 − w1(h)]Pr(Y1 = h)h
+
2∑
h=0
2∑
h′=1
[1 − w2(h, h′)]Pr(Y1 = h)Pr(Y2 = h′|Y1 = h)h′. (5.15)
This objective function is more flexible than the objective function in the con-
text of single project financing because a conglomerate’s cash flow level is deter-
mined by the sum of cash flows from independent projects. Note that each of these
two projects can be in two different states, namely θg and θb. This amounts to four
possible states for the conglomerate, (θg, θg), (θg, θb), (θb, θg) and (θb, θb).
From the perspective of HQ’s incentives, only those two states of the conglom-
erate are relevant in which his own project is in the bad state: (θb, θg) and (θb, θb).
This gives rise to two incentive constraints, one for each of these states. The next
Lemma allows to simplify these incentive constraints. It shows that it is never
optimal to provide incentives through first-period shares w∗1(0) and w∗1(1).
Lemma 5. The optimal contract has w1(0)∗ = w1(1)∗ = 0.
11Note: Pr(Y1 = h and Y2 = h′) = Pr(Y1 = h)Pr(Y2 = h′ |Y1 = h). Furthermore, E(Y2) =∑
h
∑
h′ Pr(Y1 = h and Y2 = h′)h′ =
∑
h
∑
h′ Pr(Y1 = h)Pr(Y2 = h′ |Y1 = h)h′.
.
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Proof. Consider the effect of first-period share of cash flow on HQ’s incentives to
reorganize. Suppose the conglomerate is in state (θb, θb) and that the PM reorga-
nizes his project.
If HQ reorganizes his project, first-period conglomerate cash flow is zero with
probability (1 − πR)2, one with probability 2πR(1 − πR) and two with probability
π2R. If he continues his project, conglomerate cash flow is zero with probability
(1−πR)(1−πb), one with probability πR(1−πb)+(1−πR)πb and two with probability
πRπb. HQ thus reorganizes his project, if
− (πR − πb)(1 − πR)w1(0) · 0 + (πR − πb)(
<0︷  ︸︸  ︷
1 − 2πR)w1(1) · 1
+ (πR − πb)πRw1(2) · 2 ≥ 2B.
Since positive values for w1(0) and w1(1) reduce incentives, it is optimal to choose
w1(0)∗ = w1(1)∗ = 0. The same result holds, if the PM’s project is in the good
state. 
Next, consider HQ’s incentive constraint for state (θb, θb). Lemma 5 limits the
relevant first-period shares to w1(2). This share applies only if first-period cash
flow was equal to 2. Since πR is the probability that each single project produces a
cash flow of one, first-period conglomerate cash flow is equal to 2 with probability
π2R.
Second-period shares are more complicated than first-period shares because
they are allowed to depend on first-period cash flow. Conditioning second-period
shares on first-period cash flow might improve HQ’s incentives because high first-
period cash flow is only possible if both projects produce high cash flow. For the
same reason it might be preferable to grant claims to second-period cash flow to
the HQ only if second-period cash flow is high.
With probability (1 − πR)2, first-period cash flow is zero, with probability
2πR(1 − πR) it is one, and with probability π2R it is equal to two. For each level
of first-period cash flow, second-period cash flow can either be 0, 1 or 2. Neglect-
ing the share for zero second-period cash flow leads to two relevant second-period
cash flow levels for each of the three possible first-period cash flow levels. In sum,
HQ’s expected return from reorganizing his bad project is
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π2Rw1(2) · 2
+(1 − πR)2
[
2(1 − πR)πRw2(0, 1) · 1 + π2Rw2(0, 2) · 2
]
+2πR(1 − πR)
[
2(1 − πR)πRw2(1, 1) · 1 + π2Rw2(1, 2) · 2
]
+π2R
[
2(1 − πR)πRw2(2, 1) · 1 + π2Rw2(2, 2) · 2
]
.
(5.16)
Analogously, if HQ does not reorganize his own project his expected return is
πbπRw1(2) · 2
+(1 − πR)(1 − πb) [((1 − πR)πb + πR(1 − πb)) w2(0, 1) · 1 + πRπbw2(0, 2) · 2]
+ [πR(1 − πb) + (1 − πR)πb] [((1 − πR)πb + πR(1 − πb)) w2(1, 1) · 1 + πRπbw2(1, 2) · 2]
+πRπb [((1 − πR)πb + πR(1 − πb)) w2(2, 1) · 1 + πRπbw2(2, 2) · 2]
+2B.
(5.17)
As with independent financing, HQ reaps private benefits B in each period if
it continues its own project. HQ will therefore reorganize, if (5.16) is larger than
(5.17), i.e. if
2πR · w1(2)
+(1 − πR) [πR(πR + πb − 2) + (1 − πR)(1 − πR − πb)] · w2(0, 1)
+2(1 − πR)πR(1 − πR − πb) · w2(0, 2)
+ {πR [πR(πR + πb − 2) + (1 − πR)(1 − πR − πb)]
+(1 − πR) [πR(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πR)(πR + πb)]} · w2(1, 1)
+2πR [πR(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πR)(πR + πb)] · w2(1, 2)
+πR [πR(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πR)(πR + πb)] · w2(2, 1)
+2π2R(πR + πb) · w2(2, 2)
≥ 2B/(πR − πb).
(5.18)
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The incentive constraint for state (θb, θg) is
2πg · w1(2)
+(1 − πg)
[
πg(πR + πb − 2) + (1 − πg)(1 − πR − πb)
]
· w2(0, 1)
+2(1 − πg)πg(1 − πR − πb) · w2(0, 2)
+2
{
(1 − πg)
[
πg(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πg)(πR + πb)
]
+πg
[
πg(πR + πb − 2) + (1 − πg)(1 − πR − πb)
]}
· w2(1, 1)
+2πg
[
πg(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πg)(πR + πb)
]
· w2(1, 2)
+πg
[
πg(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πg)(πR + πb)
]
· w2(2, 1)
+2π2g(πR + πb) · w2(2, 2)
≥ 2B/(πR − πb).
(5.19)
See the appendix for details.
Fortunately it is possible to simplify these incentive constraints. The next
lemma shows that it is never optimal to use the shares w2(0, 1) and w2(1, 1). The
reason is that the factors in (5.18) and (5.19) for these shares are negative, leading
to a reduction of HQ’s reorganization-incentives.
Lemma 6. w∗2(0, 1) = w∗2(1, 1) = 0.
Proof. It is first shown that w∗2(0, 1) = 0 is optimal. The expression in square
brackets of eq. (5.18) in the factor for w2(0, 1) can be rewritten as
πR(πR + πb − 2) + (1 − πR)(1 − πR − πb) = (1 − 2πR)(1 − πR − πb) − πR. (5.20)
Since 1 − 2πR < 0 and |1 − πR − πb| < πR, this expression is always negative. In
state (θb, θg), expression (5.20) changes to (1−2πg)(1−πR−πb)−πg, which is also
negative. If the investor set w∗2(0, 1) positive, entrepreneur’s incentives are reduced.
It is therefore optimal to set w∗2(0, 1) = 0. Note that negative shares are excluded
by limited liability on behalf of the entrepreneur.
It is shown next that the factor in front of w2(1, 1) in (5.18) is also negative.
This factor can be rewritten as
πR [1 − 3πR − (1 − 2πR)(πR + πb)]
+ (1 − πR) [πR + (1 − 2πR)(πR + πb)]
=(1 − 2πR)2πR + (1 − 2πR)2(πR + πb)
≤(1 − 2πR)2πR + (1 − 2πR)22πR,
(5.21)
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where the last inequality holds because πb is smaller than πR. Since −1 < 1−2πR <
0, this expression is negative. This proves that the factor of w2(1, 1) is negative,
providing negative incentives to the entrepreneur. In state (θb, θg), the last line
of (5.21) is (1 − 2πg)2πg + (1 − 2πg)22πg. This expression is also negative since
−1 < 1 − 2πg < 0. The investor therefore optimally chooses w2(1, 1)∗ = 0. 
Although Lemma 6 reduces the investor’s set of relevant shares, there are still
many possibilities left. In order to decide which share provides incentives most
effectively, their efficiency coefficient γ are calculated. Let γsw ≡ −ICsw/Vw, where
s = b refers to the state (θb, θb), while s = g refers to the state (θb, θg). The partial
derivative of the incentive constraint with respect to the share w is denoted by ICw
and the partial derivative of the investor’s objective function with respect to the
same share w is denoted by Vw. Using (5.15) and (5.18), the relevant efficiency
parameters γθw are
γb1 =
2πR
2Pr(Y1 = 2)
γb0,2 =
2πR(1 − πR)(1 − πR − πb)
2Pr(Y1 = 0)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 0)
γb1,2 =
2πR [πR(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πR)(πR + πb)]
2Pr(Y1 = 1)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 1)
γb2,1 =
πR [πR(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πR)(πR + πb)]
Pr(Y1 = 2)Pr(Y2 = 1|Y1 = 2)
γb2,2 =
2π2R(πR + πb)
2Pr(Y1 = 2)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 2)
(5.22)
from the incentive constraint for state (θb, θb), and
γ
g
1 =
2πg
2Pr(Y1 = 2)
γ
g
0,2 =
2πg(1 − πg)(1 − πR − πb)
2Pr(Y1 = 0)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 0)
γ
g
1,2 =
2πg
[
πg(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πg)(πR + πb)
]
2Pr(Y1 = 1)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 1)
γ
g
2,1 =
πg
[
πg(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πg)(πR + πb)
]
Pr(Y1 = 2)Pr(Y2 = 1|Y1 = 2)
γ
g
2,2 =
2π2g(πR + πb)
2Pr(Y1 = 2)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 2)
(5.23)
from the incentive constraint for state (θb, θg).
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Lemma 8 in the appendix shows that Pr(Y1 = 1)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 1) = Pr(Y1 =
2)Pr(Y2 = 1|Y1 = 2). Therefore, γb1,2 = γb2,1 and γ
g
1,2 = γ
g
2,1, and attention can be
limited to γs1, γ
s
0,2, γ
s
1,2 and γ
s
2,2 with s = g, b.
For any given w, only the lower of the two values of γ is relevant, since a
lower γ is associated with lower efficiency and since only the incentive constraint
associated with the lower efficiency of any given share w is binding. By inspection
of (5.22) and (5.23) and remembering that πg > πR > 12 , the set of relevant γ’s can
be narrowed down to
γ1 := γ
b
1 =
πg
Pr(Y1 = 2)
γ0,2 := γ
g
0,2 =
πg(1 − πg)(1 − πR − πb)
Pr(Y1 = 0)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 0)
γ1,2 := γ
g
1,2 =
πg
[
πg(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πg)(πR + πb)
]
Pr(Y1 = 1)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 1)
γ2,2 := γ
b
2,2 =
π2g(πR + πb)
Pr(Y1 = 2)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 2) .
(5.24)
The investor will choose the share with the highest efficiency parameter γ. This
choice depends on the parameters B, πg, πR, πb and p. No single value of γ is
maximum for all conceivable parameter configurations. Note that B only affects the
level of the incentive constraints and does not influence the relative attractiveness
of the different cash flow shares. If B were zero, the incentive constraints are
trivially satisfied, and there are no incentive problems associated with the outside
financing of the conglomerate. All positive NPV projects are financed. Increasing
B results in higher cash flow shares for the HQ and hence to incentive problems. If
B is increased above a certain threshold value, these problems become too serious,
causing the project to become nonviable. The following proposition summarizes
the previous analysis and specifies the contract an investor will optimally choose
to provide HQ with incentives to reorganize his own project.
Proposition 4. An outside investor uses the following optimal contract to provide
reorganization incentives to the HQ of a conglomerate:
w∗1(2) = BπR(πR−πb) if γ1 = γmax
w∗2(0, 2) = B(1−πg)(1−πR−πb)(πR−πb) if γ0,2 = γmax
w∗2(1, 2) = Bπg[(1−2πg)(πR+πb)+πg](πR−πb) if γ1,2 = γmax
w∗2(2, 2) = Bπ2g(πR+πb)(πR−πb) if γ2,2 = γmax,
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where γmax := max
{
γ1, γ0,2, γ1,2, γ2,2
}
. Her expected return is
Vc∗ = 4E(y) − R∗(p, πb, πR, πg, B),
where
R∗(p, πb, πR, πg, B) = 2 ·

w∗1(2)Pr(Y1 = 2) if γ1 = γmax
w∗2(0, 2)Pr(Y1 = 0)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 2) if γ0,2 = γmax
w∗2(1, 2)Pr(Y1 = 1)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 2) if γ1,2 = γmax
w∗2(2, 2)Pr(Y2 = 2)Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 2) if γ2,2 = γmax,
denotes HQ’s expected share of cash flow.
Proof. Incentives are most effectively provided through the share w with the high-
est γ.
If γ1 is maximum, first-period share w1(2) is most efficient. In this case (5.24)
shows that the incentive constraint for state (θb, θb) is binding. From (5.18), we
have w∗1(2) = BπR(πR−πb) .
If γ0,2 is maximum, second-period share w2(0, 2) is most efficient. In this case
(5.24) shows that the incentive constraint for state (θb, θg) is binding. From (5.19),
one has w∗2(0, 2) = B(1−πg)(1−πR−πb)(πR−πb) .
If γ1,2 is maximum, second-period share w2(1, 2) is most efficient. In this case
(5.24) shows that the incentive constraint for state (θb, θg) is binding. From (5.19),
it follows that w∗2(0, 2) = Bπg[(1−2πg)(πR+πb)+πg](πR−πb) .
Finally, if γ2,2 is highest, second-period share w2(2, 2) is most efficient. In this
case (5.24) shows that the incentive constraint for state (θb, θb) is binding. From
(5.18), w∗2(2, 2) = Bπ2g(πR+πb)(πR−πb) follows.
The investor’s maximum expected return is calculated by plugging the optimal
cash flow share into the investor’s objective function (5.15). Note that ∑2h=0 ∑2h′=0 Pr(Y1 =
h)Pr(Y2 = h′|Y1 = h)h′ = ∑2h=0 Pr(Y1 = h)h = 2E(y). Maximum expected
return is thus equal to 4E(y) minus entrepreneur’s expected share of cash flow
R∗(p, πb, πR, πg, B) as defined in the proposition.
This proofs the proposition. 
So far only HQ’s incentives with regard to its own project were considered.
Proposition 4 takes it for granted that the PM reorganizes his own project. In
order to isolate HQ’s incentives, it was assumed that the PM behaves optimally. A
conglomerate, however, needs to take its internal agency problem between HQ and
PM serious, making sure that the PM has an incentive to reorganize his project.
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However, the financial contract between investor and HQ studied so far does not
provide any such incentive to the PM.
The next section analyzes the relationship between HQ and PM. As it turns
out, the above financial contract between HQ and investor remains valid, but the
investor will have to provide some extra liquidity in excess of 2I.
5.3.2 Informal Employment Contract Between HQ and PM
As argued above, conglomerate financing is disadvantageous compared to indepen-
dent project financing in providing incentives because financial contracts can only
be conditioned on total conglomerate cash flow. For conglomerate financing to be
an attractive alternative at all, HQ and PM must take advantage of their superior
knowledge. Since an informed party observes the state of the project as well as
action chosen, an informal contract conditioning on these two variables is possible
as long as this contract is self-enforcing.
Such an employment contract has the HQ “employing” the PM and command-
ing him to run the project. In order to induce PM to reorganize a bad project, HQ
can threaten to fire him if he does not behave. If fired, the PM is separated from
his project and receives nothing. HQ on the other hand may be able to liquidate the
project.
An employment contract defines a transfer z(θ, a) from HQ to PM depending on
the PM’s state of the project and choice of action. Because the game ends at t = 2,
there will be no transfers at t = 2. All transfers to the PM must thus be made at
t = 1. Analogous to Assumption 1, it is assumed that the HQ has all the bargaining
power vis-à-vis the PM and that the investor has all the bargaining power vis-à-vis
the HQ. Since PM needs only be compensated for his loss of private benefits in
state θb, HQ will choose z(θg,C) = z(θg,R) = z(θb,C) = 0 and z(θb,R) = 2B.
The conglomerate itself being liquidity-constrained, it must secure itself funds
in addition to investment costs 2I in order to be able to make payment 2B to the
PM. Otherwise, HQ’s share of cash flow at t = 1 might not be sufficient to pay PM.
More importantly, if HQ had to finance the transfer z(θb,R) out of its share of cash
flow, then the conglomerate will be less profitable than two independent projects.
The reason is that mitigating HQ’s liquidity problem by increasing its cash flow
shares nullifies its informational advantage because claims to cash flow cannot be
made contingent on the states realized or action chosen.
Because the optimal financial contract defined in Proposition 4 does not allow
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for positive cash flow shares in period one, the funds needed to compensate the
PM must be made available to the HQ by the investor. The minimally required
compensation is 2B. The investor therefore needs to finance the conglomerate with
2I+2B to guarantee investment (2I) and excess liquidity for the case the PM has to
be paid the wage 2B at t = 1. It is reasonable to assume that such wage payments
are verifiable. After all, conglomerate cash flow was assumed to be verifiable as
well. If HQ does not pay this wage, the investor will therefore reclaim 2B at t = 1
from the HQ.
For the HQ to have an incentive to pay the wage to the PM at t = 1, the
return from making this transfer must be larger than the return from liquidating the
project. If the PM reorganized his bad project, then by paying him 2B at t = 1, HQ
secures itself a higher expected conglomerate cash flow for t = 2. Would HQ not
make the payment, the PM quits and the project must be liquidated, yielding lower
expected cash flow.
Remember that the optimal contract in Proposition 4 guarantees the HQ cash
flow shares contingent on first-period cash flow being equal to 2. If Y1 < 2 HQ
knows that it will receive no cash flow at all in t = 2 and is as a consequence indif-
ferent between paying the PM and not paying him. This difficulty is circumvented
by granting an arbitrarily small but positive share of cash flow to the HQ for any
level of first-period cash flow realization. HQ will therefore pay the wage if the PM
reorganizes his bad project. Note that HQ cannot divert excess liquidity to itself in
case it does not pay the wage to the PM since it has to repay all excess liquidity to
the investor at t = 1.
On the other hand, HQ will fire the PM and liquidate the project, if he does not
reorganize a bad project. If he did not liquidate the project, it would be successful
with probability πb, whereas liquidating yields a success probability of π0 ≥ πb.
HQ will therefore fire the PM if he does not reorganize his bad project.
Finally, the PM weakly prefers to quit at t = 1 if he does not receive wage 2B
after having reorganized a bad project. Whether he stays or quits, the PM receives
nothing either way. Similarly he weakly prefers to stay after having received 2B
for reorganizing a bad project. He receives nothing at t = 2 whether he stays or
quits.
There is some ambiguity with respect to the fraction of the liquidity grant 2B
repaid to the investor. The contract forces HQ to pay the 2B either to his PM or
to the investor. As argued above, HQ will pay the 2B to his PM in case the PM
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reorganized a bad project. But what happens if the PM’s project was in the good
state? In this case, HQ is indifferent between paying the PM or paying the investor.
If HQ’s expected second-period share of profit at t = 1 is positive, then the PM
could try to extract the 2B from HQ. The PM can threaten to quit12, in which case
HQ has to liquidate the project wherefrom he earns a fraction of π0. Since this is
smaller than πR while HQ is indifferent between paying and not paying 2B to the
PM, he will cave in to PM’s threat and pay him 2B.
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to expect HQ to make the payment 2B to his
PM rather than to the outside investor in case of indifference. After all, HQ has
much closer ties to his employees than to the investor causing him to weigh PM’s
preferences more strongly than those of an outsider. 13
Total investment for financing the conglomerate therefore amounts to 2I + 2B.
With independent project financing, it is only 2I; on the other hand the investor has
to provide higher shares of cash flow to the single entrepreneur.
The investor’s expected return from the contract with the conglomerate is
4E(y) − 2B − R∗
(
p, πb, πR, πg, b
)
, (5.25)
where R∗
(
p, πb, πR, πg, B
)
denotes HQ’s expected cash flow share, as derived in
Proposition 4.
5.3.3 Conglomerate Financing Compared to Independent Financing
As Proposition 4 demonstrates, no clear-cut result for the investor’s problem is
available without limiting the model’s parameter space. In order to illustrate the
results, private benefits B are fixed at 0.2. Furthermore, attention is limited to four
different sets of parameters:
(a) :=
{
p = 0.5, πR = 0.6, πg = 0.9
}
(b) :=
{
p = 0.5, πR = 0.8, πg = 0.9
}
(c) :=
{
p = 0.25, πR = 0.6, πg = 0.9
}
(d) :=
{
p = 0.25, πR = 0.8, πg = 0.9
}
.
(5.26)
This restriction allows to analyze the effect of a change in the a priori probability
of the project being in the good state (p) as well as the effect of an increase of the
12The PM’s threat is weakly credible, since absent any wage transfer he earns nothing from either
staying or quitting.
13See Hart and Holmstrom (2002), where a similar assumption is made.
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of expected returns V between independent financing and
conglomerate financing for four different sets of parameters p, πg (pig) and πR
(piR), see (5.26). Private benefits are fixed at B = 0.2.
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difference πg − πR. For each set of parameters, expected returns from independent
financing is compared to expected returns from conglomerate financing at varying
levels of πb.14 The results are illustrated in Figure 5.3. The kinks in the investor’s
expected return functions are due to the piecewise nature of the optimal contracts
as derived in Propositions 3 and 4.
Standard Moral Hazard. With the a priori probability of the project being suc-
cessful p = 0, the contracting parties are certain to find themselves in the bad
state. The contracting problem then reduces to a standard moral hazard problem
with a risk neutral agent “protected” by limited liability. Financing both projects
jointly via a conglomerate relaxes this limited liability constraint. Even if HQ’s
own project produces zero cash flow, HQ can still be punished by taking him away
any cash flow generated by the other project.15 With single project financing this is
not possible because the entrepreneur must only worry about losing the cash flow
generated by his own project. A decrease of p therefore boosts the advantage of
the conglomerate ceteris paribus.
Probability of Success Identical in Both Project States (πR = πg). Note that
incentive constraints are identical for states of the conglomerate (θb, θb) and (θb, θg)
if the probability of success is identical in each project-state, i.e. if πR = πg.
Moreover, the next lemma shows that conglomerate financing is always preferred
to independent financing if πR = πg.
Lemma 7. If πR = πg, the uninformed investor prefers conglomerate financing to
independent financing if πb > 0. Expected returns from conglomerate financing is
given by
Vc = 4πg −
1 + π
2
g
π2g − π
2
b
 2B.
Proof. With πR = πg, the optimal contract for financing a conglomerate is unam-
biguously given by w∗2(2, 2) = b/π2g(π2g − π2b), see Proposition 4. All other shares
14The γ’s can be interpreted as functions of πb Note that γ1 is independent of πb, γ2,2 is increasing
in πb while γ0,2 and γ1,2 are both decreasing in πb.
15This effect is reminiscent of Laux (2001), where the advantage of financing multiple projects
jointly stems from a relaxed limited liability constraint.
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are equal to zero. Investor’s expected returns are
Vc = 4E(y1) − w∗2(2, 2)E(y1)2E(y2|y1 = 1)22 − 2B
= 4πg −
π4g + π
2
g(π2g − π2b)
π2g(π2g − π2b)
2B.
(5.27)
Note that E(y) = E(y2|y1 = 1) = πg. If the projects are financed independently,
the optimal contract requires w∗2(1) = 2B/(π2g − π2b) and zero for all other shares.
Investor’s expected returns are
2 · V s = 2 ·
[
2E(y1) − w∗2(1)E(y1)E(y2 |y1 = 1)
]
= 4πg −
2π2g
π2g − π
2
b
2B.
(5.28)
Expected returns from financing a conglomerate are greater than expected return
from independent financing, if
π4g + π
2
g(π2g − π2b)
π2g(π2g − π2b)
<
2π2g
π2g − π
2
b
⇔ 2π2g − π2b < 2π
2
g,
(5.29)
which is always satisfied as long as πb > 0. This proves Lemma 7. 
Lemma 7 makes clear that for independent financing to be preferable to con-
glomerate financing at all, the success probability for project-state θb must be
strictly smaller than the success probability for project-state θg.
The intuition is the following. With πR = πg, the probability of success does
not depend on the realized state. The only difference between the two states is that
the entrepreneur forgoes some private benefits in the bad state and must be com-
pensated accordingly. Even if the bad state is realized, the project is as profitable
as in the good state. In contrast, πR < πg represents a different environment. If the
bad state is realized, the project’s probability of success is lower. This case might
represent a project which is reasonably profitable if the business environment de-
velops as assumed in the project’s business plan but where it is ambiguous what
happens if the world develops differently. The entrepreneur still looses his private
benefits in the bad state, but in addition the project is now less profitable. In such
an environment, low cash flow is a less informative signal for the behavior of both
the single entrepreneur and HQ than if πR = πg. Since w∗2(2, 2) only rewards HQ
if the project was very successful (highest cash flow realized in both periods), it is
generally not optimal to use w2(2, 2) if πR < πg.
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But if incentives are no longer provided by w2(2, 2) then HQ can profit from
the PM’s project being successful. Even if his own project delivers zero cash flow,
PM’s project might still deliver positive cash flow. This reduces HQ’s incentive
to reorganize. Such a “cross-subsidy” is not available with independent project
financing, thus boosting its advantage relative to conglomerate financing.
Increasing πb. Remember that πb is a bad project’s expected return if it is not
reorganized. The higher πb, the smaller the loss associated with a non-performing
entrepreneur. However, in this case the investor must offer a higher expected share
of cash flow to the entrepreneur in order to induce him to reorganize. In case of a
conglomerate, the informal employment contract between HQ and PM causes the
cost of inducing the PM to reorganize to be independent of πb. Rather it is constant
equal to 2B. An increase in πb therefore eventually favors conglomerates.
Note also that an increase in πb increases the attractiveness of a laissez-faire
contract (see section 5.2.1) which does not provide incentives to reorganize at all.
For a sufficiently high value of πb, such a contract dominates both conglomerate
and independent project financing. This is illustrated by the linearly increasing line
in Figure 5.3.
In sum, the smaller the difference πg−πR and the smaller the a priori probability
of the good project-state (p), the more attractive is conglomerate financing. A third
important finding is that projects optimally financed independently exhibit higher
expected return than projects optimally financed as conglomerates. This prediction
is consistent with empirical findings which suggest that conglomerates trade at a
discount (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). However, the reason for
the discount is not that conglomerates are less efficient than independently financed
projects. Rather the reason is selectivity. This is in line with arguments put forth
by Fluck and Lynch (1999) and Graham et al. (2002) that an important reason for
the observed conglomerate discount might be due to endogeneity.
5.4 Conclusion
This paper presents a model based on Aghion and Bolton (1992), where pennyless
entrepreneurs need to contract for funds with investors to start their projects. A
project lasts two periods and requires different action choices in different states.
Entrepreneurs’ private benefits associated with a specific action (continuation of
121
Can Conglomerates Ease Credit Constraints?
the project) generates a costly moral hazard problem. The optimal contract speci-
fies claims to cash flow for the entrepreneur devised to guarantee the that investor’s
preferred action is chosen. Since the investor can no longer appropriate all cash
flow, not all projects with positive net present value will be financed. Entrepre-
neurs are thus credit-constrained.
These credit constraints can be mitigated through “conglomeration”. Conglom-
eration refers to two entrepreneurs financing their projects jointly. One acting as
the conglomerate’s headquarters, the other as the project manager. By treating en-
trepreneurs inside and outside a conglomerate symmetric in terms of capabilities,
no superior abilities are assumed for headquarters. Both projects require a found-
ing entrepreneur, and entrepreneurs enjoy private benefits from continuing rather
than reorganizing their projects. The sole potential advantage of a conglomerate
stems from the superior information of entrepreneurs with regard to the quality of
their projects.
In contrast to existing literature this paper shows how and under which con-
ditions the superior information of headquarters increases the investor’s expected
return. The difficulty is that although headquarters has more information, it is
not verifiable to outside parties. Hence it is not guaranteed that this informational
advantage is of any use to headquarters. The solution proposed is that informal
contracting is available inside the conglomerate whereas an external investor has
to rely on formal contracting alone.
Since headquarters and product manager share the same symmetric informa-
tion, they can contract on an informal basis and need not rely on verifiable con-
tracts. Due to the financial contract entered with the investor, headquarters has
an interest in project managers behaving in a cash flow maximizing manner, us-
ing an informal employment contract to induce project managers to behave. The
advantage of forming a conglomerate thus is that it enables the investor to benefit
from headquarters superior information about the quality of the project run by the
project manager.
The disadvantage of forming a conglomerate is that the investor can no longer
contract on the cash flows of individual projects. While total cash flow is ob-
servable and verifiable, headquarters can transfer funds internally at his discretion,
making individual cash flows no longer verifiable to third parties (namely, courts).
This results in a loss of information to the investor causing the cost of providing
incentives to increase.
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The tradeoff between benefits from headquarters’ superior information and in-
formation loss due to cash flow pooling permits to formulate predictions concern-
ing the types of projects that preferably are financed independently and which are
better financed as a conglomerate. For projects characterized by a high a prior
probability of the good state and by low expected return in case a bad project is
not reorganized, independent financing is preferable. In other words, if the agency
problem is not too strong, independent financing is superior to conglomerate fi-
nancing.
Furthermore, it turns out that projects that are preferably financed indepen-
dently deliver higher expected returns to the investor than projects which are prefer-
ably financed as conglomerates. This supports the hypothesis put forth in the lit-
erature (see, e.g., Fluck and Lynch, 1999; Graham et al., 2002), that the observed
conglomerate discount is due to selection by investors rather than to conglomerates
being inherently less efficient than stand-alone firms.
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Appendix
Lemma 8. Some properties of joint probabilities:
(i):
Pr(Y2 = 0|Y1 = 1) = Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 1)Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 0)
Pr(Y2 = 0|Y1 = 2) = Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 1)2
Pr(Y2 = 1|Y1 = 1) = Pr(y1 = 1|y2 = 0)Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 1)
+ Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 0)Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 1)
Pr(Y2 = 1|Y1 = 2) = 2Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 1)Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 1)
Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 0) = Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 0)2
Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 1) = Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 1)Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 0)
Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 2) = Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 1)2.
(ii):
Pr(y1 = 1)Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 1) = Pr(y1 = 0)Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 0). (5.30)
Proof. Proof of Part (i): Remember that Yt = y1t + y2t and that y1 and y2 are inde-
pendent. Then
Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 1) = Pr(Y2 = 2|(y11 = 1 and y21 = 0) or (y11 = 0 and y21 = 1))
= 12 Pr(Y2 = 2|(y11 = 1 and y21 = 0)) + 12 Pr(Y2 = 2|y11 = 0 and y21 = 1)
= Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 1)Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 0).
Analogously, Pr(Y2 = 0|Y1 = 1) = Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 1)Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 0). Further-
more,
Pr(Y2 = 1|Y1 = 2) = Pr(Y2 = 1|(y11 = 1 and y21 = 1)
= Pr(y12 = 1|y11 = 1)Pr(y22 = 0|y21 = 1)
+ Pr(y12 = 0|y11 = 1)Pr(y22 = 1|y21 = 1)
= 2Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 1)Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 1)
and
Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 2) = Pr(Y2 = 2|y11 = 1 and y21 = 1)
= Pr(y12 = 1|y11 = 1 and y21 = 1) · Pr(y22 = 1|y11 = 1 and y21 = 1)
= Pr(y12 = 1|y11 = 1) · Pr(y22 = 1|y21 = 1)
= Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 1)2.
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Analogously,
Pr(Y2 = 2|Y1 = 0) = Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 0)2 and Pr(Y2 = 0|Y1 = 0) = Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 0)2.
Finally,
Pr(Y2 = 1|Y1 = 1) = Pr(Y2 = 1|(y11 = 1 and y21 = 0) or (y11 = 0 and y21 = 1))
= 12 Pr(Y1 = 2|(y11 = 1 and y21 = 0)) + 12 Pr(Y2 = 1|y11 = 0 and y21 = 1)
= Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 1)Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 0)
+ Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 1)Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 0).
This proof part (i).
For part (ii), note that
Pr(y1 = 1)Pr(y2 = 0|y1 = 1)
= Pr(y1 = 1)
(
pπg
Pr(y1 = 1)(1 − πg) +
(1 − p)πR
Pr(y1 = 1) (1 − πR)
)
= pπg(1 − πg) + (1 − p)πR(1 − πR).
and that
Pr(y1 = 0)Pr(y2 = 1|y1 = 0)
= Pr(y1 = 0)
(
p(1 − πg)
Pr(y1 = 0)πg +
(1 − p)(1 − πR)
Pr(y1 = 0) πR
)
= pπg(1 − πg) + (1 − p)πR(1 − πR),
which proofs the claim in the lemma. 
Conglomerate IC for state (θb, θg) HQ’s return from reorganizing in state (θb, θg),
assuming the PM reorganizes his project, is:
πgπRw1(2) · 2
+(1 − πg)(1 − πR)
{
[πg(1 − πR) + πR(1 − πg)]w2(0, 1) · 1 + πRπgw2(0, 2) · 2
}
+[πg(1 − πR) + (1 − πg)πR]
{
[πg(1 − πR) + πR(1 − πg)]w2(1, 1) · 1 + πRπgw2(1, 2) · 2
}
+πRπg
{
[πg(1 − πR) + πR(1 − πg)]w2(2, 1) · 1 + πRπgw2(2, 2) · 2
}
(5.31)
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If HQ does not reorganize, his return is
πgπbw1(2) · 2
+(1 − πg)(1 − πb)
{
[πg(1 − πb) + πb(1 − πg)]w2(0, 1) · 1 + πbπgw2(0, 2) · 2
}
+[πg(1 − πb) + (1 − πg)πb]
{
[πg(1 − πb) + πb(1 − πg)]w2(1, 1) · 1 + πbπgw2(1, 2) · 2
}
+πgπb
{
[πg(1 − πb) + πb(1 − πg)]w2(2, 1) · 1 + πbπgw2(2, 2) · 2
}
+2B
(5.32)
He will therefore reorganize, if (5.31) is larger than (5.32), i.e. if
2πg · w1(2)
+(1 − πg)
[
πg(πR + πb − 2) + (1 − πg)(1 − πR − πb)
]
· w2(0, 1)
+2(1 − πg)πg(1 − πR − πb) · w2(0, 2)
+
{
πg
[
πg(πR + πb − 2) + (1 − πg)(1 − πR − πb)
]
+(1 − πg)
[
πg(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πg)(πR + πb)
]}
· w2(1, 1)
+2πg
[
πg(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πg)(πR + πb)
]
· w2(1, 2)
+πg
[
πg(1 − πR − πb) + (1 − πg)(πR + πb)
]
· w2(2, 1)
+2π2g(πR + πb) · w2(2, 2)
≥ 2B/(πR − πb)
(5.33)
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The conclusion is confined to a brief discussion of possible extensions to the mod-
els presented in chapters 4 and 5.
The third essay on switching costs provides interesting testable predictions.
First, prices of chain stores are predicted to be higher than prices of comparable
local stores. The hotel industry is a good candidate to empirically test this predic-
tion. Constructing a dataset of hotels in a given city region (e.g. Manhattan, New
York) and regressing room rates on characteristics such as quality, location and
an indicator for chain stores would provide an empirical test for the alleged price
pattern. Second, as mobility increases the model predicts increasing market share
for chain stores relative to local stores. If increased demand is met by an increased
number of outlets, the model predicts that more chain store outlets relative to local
stores are observed along axes of high mobility. Here, the coffee-shop industry
(Starbucks) would provide a potentially fruitful field for research.
An important drawback of the conglomerate model in chapter 5 is that con-
trol over actions is always allocated to the entrepreneur. Since the investor cannot
run or reorganize projects herself, her only option available is to liquidate them.
Therefore, she prefers the entrepreneur to be in charge of the project and to devise
an optimal incentive contract, such that bad projects are always reorganized by the
entrepreneur. This contrasts with reported evidence from the venture capital in-
dustry (see, e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001), which states that
allocation of control rights contingent on performance is an important governance
instrument. An interesting extension of the model presumably leading to contin-
gent control allocation would be to allow for different types of entrepreneurs. If
only a fraction of the population of entrepreneurs is competent and thus capable of
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reorganizing bad projects, control rights are relevant. It is conjectured that in such
a world control would be allocated to the investor if first period cash flow was low.
The investor would then replace the existing entrepreneur by a new one or liquidate
the project.
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